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MOOT COURT COMPETITION

BENCH MEMORANDUM
INTERNET DEFAMATION:
JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE AND
THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE

by GARY L. GAssMANt
THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL
NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION IN INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY LAW
No. 95-241

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF MARSHALL
JENNIFER FETTY,

)

Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

ROBERT JACOBS,
Defendant.

)
)

)
)

)

I.

RECORD ON APPEAL

OPINION
WOBURT,

B.,

PRESIDING JUSTICE

This is an interlocutory' appeal from orders of the Circuit Court of
t

Research Director for the Center for Informatics Law. J.D., The John Marshall

Law School, BA., Indiana University. Special thanks to my research assistant, Jennifer
Hall Gonzalez, (J.D. candidate, June 1996, The John Marshall Law School) in the preparation of the problem and bench memorandum for this competition.
1. In Marshall, appeals may be immediately taken on certain issues in a case. Such
review requires circuit and appellate court certification. Normally, certification is granted
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Lakeview County denying defendant's motions to dismiss the plaintiffs
defamation action. The claim was filed in that court on January 5, 1995.
Defendant fied an appearance specifically to challenge jurisdiction.
That motion was denied and he subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs cause of action for insufficiency of the complaint. Circuit
Judge Paul Hanson held that (1) the defendant was subject to personal
jurisdiction in the State of Marshall under the Marshall long-arm statute; and (2) the plaintiff is not a public figure merely by virtue of communicating through the Internet. 2 The plaintiffs petition in the defamation
action alleged the following facts relevant to this appeal:
Defendant, Robert Jacobs is a computer salesman who resides in Addison, Illinois. He is an active computer user who subscribes to an electronic communications service which provides access to the Internet.
Plaintiff, Jennifer Fetty is a cashier of a local convenience store who
resides in Peoria, Illinois. She is a computer hobbyist who also has access to the Internet through an online service provider.
During the months of November and December, 1993, both Fetty
and Jacobs were part of a discussion group conversing on CanWeChat, a
Bulletin Board Service, ("BBS") hosted by a sysop in Chicago, Illinois.
The topic of discussion was abortion. The plaintiff, defendant, and
others participating in the CanWeChat discussion group expressed their
views on the subject. Jacobs allegedly supported the legality of abortion
and the rights of women to choose to terminate pregnancy in accord with
the standards of Roe v. Wade, 3 while Fetty expressed firm opposition to
abortion on both religious and moral grounds.
On December 4, 1993, Jacobs and Fetty were logged onto
CanWeChat with others, and continued to debate the abortion issue. At
one point in the discussion, Jacobs posted the following message: "As for
Fetty's opinions on this matter, I'm not going to let some woman who
prostitutes herself dictate my standards of conduct or morality." David
Bornmann, a resident of Crossroads, in the State of Marshall, was part
of the CanWeChat discussion group at that time. Bornmann replied to
the Jacobs message quoted above, stating: "I object to mean-spirited and
slanderous personal accusations, and if Robert Jacobs can't be civil I suggest that he leave this discussion."
where the issues involve questions where there is substantial ground for differences of
opinion and where the issues involve controlling questions of law. Moreover, Marshall
courts seek to advance the termination of the litigation as quickly as possible. In the present case, both Judge Hanson of the circuit court, and this court, certified the issues of personal jurisdiction and defective pleadings for immediate review.
2. The Court takes notice that Internet is an international electronic network easily
available to the public by linking computers and transmitting information.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), modified, Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
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Fetty's complaint alleged that Jacobs, out of spite and ill will, published a defamatory statement about her in Marshall, and elsewhere,
which was reasonably understood as defamatory and which caused her
injury in Marshall, and elsewhere. Such allegations satisfy the common
law elements required in order for Fetty to establish a prima facie case
for defamation in Marshall. Fetty requested damages in the amount of
4
five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00). The statute of limitations
for a cause of action for defamation in Marshall is two years from the
date the violation occurred.
Jacobs' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction was based on the ground that he was not a domiciliary of the State
of Marshall, nor had he visited the state or conducted any business in
Marshall. Other than the facts set forth herein, the complaint alleged no
other basis for the presence of either party in the State of Marshall. In
the lower court, Fetty successfully argued that Jacobs is subject to jurisdiction under Marshall's long-arm statute for two reasons. First, the tort
was committed in the State of Marshall. Second, injury was caused to
Fetty, also in the State of Marshall.
The Marshall long-arm statute reads as follows:
MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES
MARSHALL LONG-ARM STATUTE

Chapter 48
I.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION BY ACTS OF A NON-DOMICILIARY.

A. Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries,
their administrators or executors, as to courses of action which arise
from conduct enumerated in this section, who in person or through an
agent:
1) conduct or transact business within the state of Marshall;
2) commit a tortious act within the state of Marshall; or
3) commit a tortious act outside the state of Marshall which
causes injury to persons or property within the state of Marshall, if he or she
(a) regularly conducts or solicits business, or engages
in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from services rendered or goods
consumed or used in the state of Marshall, or
(b) expects or should reasonably expect his or her
conduct to have consequences in the state of Marshall
and derives substantial revenue from interstate or
international commerce.
4. The statute of limitations in Illinois, for a defamation action, is one year from the
time the violation accrued. 735 ILCS 5/13-201 (1992).
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The procedures that Fetty undertook for perfecting service on Jacobs
pursuant to the statute were proper, but Jacobs argued that the few
messages he posted from Addison, Illinois, on the BBS located in Chicago, Illinois, and merely viewed in Marshall, did not satisfy the minimum contacts requirements of the due process clause of the United
States Constitution.
Additionally, Jacobs asserted that Fetty's complaint is fatally defective in that as a limited public figure, she fails to allege that he acted
with "actual malice" in publishing the statement, as required by the New
York Times v. Sullivan,5 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,6 cases.
Judge Hanson, properly taking the foregoing facts as true, held that
Jacobs was subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Marshall
under the Marshall long-arm statute. Regarding the claim of insufficiency of the complaint, Judge Hanson held that, as a matter of law,
Fetty was not a public figure under constitutional standards merely by
virtue of her participation in a discussion over the Internet, and no other
basis was urged.
Jacobs filed a timely interlocutory appeal with this court, certified to
us by the Circuit Court of Lakeview County. Because this case is before
this court on motions to dismiss, we accept as true for the purposes of the
motions, the facts as set forth herein and we review de novo the questions of law. Both issues here are matters of first impression in this
court.
II.
I.

DISCUSSION

WHETHER THE MARSHALL LONG-ARM STATUTE,

MRS

CH.

48 § I,

PROPERLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBJECTS THE DEFENDANT
TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE STATE OF

MARSHALL.

In the present case, Jacobs asserts that he has no physical connection with the State of Marshall. This Court, however, finds that he is
subject to personal jurisdiction under the Marshall long-arm statute because of his participation on the BBS which, regardless of his physical
presence in Illinois, gave him virtual and legal presence in the State of
Marshall. Jacobs' allegedly defamatory statement on the CanWeChat
BBS was published in Marshall and thus the alleged tort was committed
here as required under the long-arm statute.
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
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II.

WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC FIGURE MERELY BY
VIRTUE OF HER ACTIONS ON THE INTERNET.

Fetty is not a public figure merely because of her participation in a
discussion of a controversial issue which was widely published on the
Internet. No other basis was alleged in the complaint or other pleadings
to support that status, as described in the New York Times and Gertz
cases. Therefore, plaintiff has no burden of proving that the defendant
posted the defamatory matter with the constitutional requirement of "actual malice."
CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing discussion, this court affirms the orders denying defendant's motions to dismiss on all counts.
AFFIRMED.
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED

A. WHETHER THE MARSHALL LONG-ARM STATUTE, MRS CH. 48 § I,
PROPERLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY SUBJECTS THE DEFENDANT
TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE STATE OF

MARSHALL.

B.

WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF IS A PUBLIC FIGURE, AS REQUIRED BY
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS,

BECAUSE OF HER PARTICIPATION

IN A DISCUSSION OF A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE
WIDELY PUBLISHED ON THE INTERNET.

IV. ANALYSIS

A.
1.

ISSUE ONE - PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Legal History

i. PersonalJurisdiction
A court must have jurisdiction over the parties before they are obligated to comply with the orders of the court.7 The United States
Supreme Court addressed this specific issue in InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington.8 In InternationalShoe, the defendant was a shoe manufacturer, incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place of business in
St. Louis, Missouri. 9 The defendant's salesmen, who were located in the
forum state, Washington, solicited orders from prospective buyers in
7. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 313.

568

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XW

Washington and transmitted the orders to the St. Louis office to be filled
and shipped back.10 The Supreme Court found that the continuous and
systematic business activities of the defendant in Washington, resulting
in many interstate sales, justified the exercise of personal jurisdiction
there. 1 Furthermore, the Court held that a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the due process clause if the defendant had
"certain minimum contacts with .. . [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub2
stantial justice.'"1
In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co., 1 3 the Supreme Court
held that states could exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants
based on a single contract with a state resident, provided that the contract had a substantial connection with the state. 14 In McGee, the Court
upheld jurisdiction where an insurance company's only physical contact
with California consisted of mailings to insure a California resident, and
the receipt of premium checks for a period of two years.15 Jurisdiction in
McGee was found in part because the defendant initiated the contact
with the forum state.' 6
Contrary to these holdings, in Hanson v. Denckla,17 the United
States Supreme Court stated that a court could not exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant where there was no "act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within8
the forum State thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."'

In Hanson, a Delaware resident established a trust with a Delaware
company which had no activities in Florida; later she moved to Florida.
Upon her death in Florida, a controversy arose and the Delaware trust
company was named as a party in a suit fied in Florida.' 9 The Supreme
Court found that the Delaware company did not have the sufficient mini20
mum contacts to subject it to jurisdiction in Florida.
Twenty years later, in Kulko v. Superior Court,2 1 a defendant father,
and a resident of New York, challenged California's exercise of jurisdic10.
11.
12.
(1940)).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 314.
Id. at 320.
InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 221-222.
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 253 (citing InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 251-254.
436 U.S. 84 (1978), reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978).
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tion where he had no personal physical contact with the state. 2 2 The
parties, who had been husband and wife, entered into a separation
agreement, in New York, where they were originally residents. 2 3 Later,
the wife obtained a divorce in Haiti, and thereafter moved to California,
where she brought an action to modify the child custody decree of the
New York court that had granted the defendant custody during the
school year.2 4 The United States Supreme Court stated that jurisdiction
based on the effects within a state that result from activity outside the
state is proper only if it was commercial activity which affected forum
state residents, or if it was wrongful activity which caused injury within
the state. 25 Defendant's mere act of sending his child to California from
New York to live with the mother, provided no basis for personal jurisdiction over the father.
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 26 the defendant car
dealership sold a car to the plaintiff in New York. 2 7 Later, while driving
in Oklahoma, the plaintiffs were in an accident where their car caught
fire and caused serious injuries. 28 The plaintiff sued the dealership in
Oklahoma. The Court found that the defendant did not seek or serve the
Oklahoma market and concluded that "those affiliating circumstances
that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction,"
did not exist. 2 9 The Court stated that the foreseeability of contact which
is relevant is "that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being hailed
into court there," not the foreseeability that a product may find its way
30
into the forum state.
In Keeton v. Hustler,3 ' a resident of New York sued Hustler magazine for libel in New Hampshire, where defendant regularly distributed
its magazine.3 2 The plaintiff had virtually no connection with the state
of New Hampshire, and was not well known there; in fact, he picked that
forum because of New Hampshire's six-year statute of limitations for defamation claims. 33 The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction because of de34
fendant's New Hampshire contacts.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 88.
Id. at 86-7.
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 96.
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 297.
465 U.S. 770 (1984).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 781.
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In Calder v. Jones,3 5 Shirley Jones brought an action in California
for libel against the National Enquirer, a Florida corporation. The
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's free-speech arguments and held
that the First Amendment does not require a special jurisdictional standard for libel cases. 3 6 The Court decided that analysis of First Amend-

ment considerations would "needlessly complicate" the already difficult
and fact-specific minimum contacts inquiry.37 The article was written in
Florida from information received from California via the phone. 38 However, California was the state where the Enquirer had its largest circulation and the defendant's acts were expressly aimed at California, so the
defendant's could "reasonably have anticipated being haled into court
39
there."
Finally, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 40 a Florida-based
franchisor sued a Michigan individual in Florida for breach of contract
after they entered into a franchise agreement through interstate communication. The Supreme Court found that the defendant was properly
subject to the Florida long-arm statute. 4 1 The Court evaluated whether
the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum
state to decide whether the defendant could reasonably anticipate or
foresee that any actions he may take in connection with the franchise
could lead to litigation in Florida. 42 The Court found that the defendant
"reached out beyond Michigan" and negotiated the purchase of a longterm franchise with a Florida corporation.4 3 The contract documents
emphasized that operations were conducted and supervised from Florida, all notices and payments were to be sent to Florida, the agreements
were made in and enforced from Florida, and all decision making authority vested in the Florida headquarters. 44 Consequently, because modern
commercial life allows for the conducting of business and communications across state lines, the fact that the defendant never entered the
forum state did not defeat jurisdiction. As long as efforts are "purposefully directed" at the residents of another state, the absence of physical
45
contacts will not defeat jurisdiction.
35. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
36. Id. at 790.

37. Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 785-86.
Id. at 789.
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
Id. at 478.
Id. at 480.

43. Id.
44. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-481.

45. Id. at 476.

1996]
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General v. Specific Jurisdiction

When assessing how much contact a defendant must have with a
forum for the valid exercise of jurisdiction, the Court has divided the exercise of jurisdiction into two categories. A distinction between general
and specific jurisdiction was articulated by the United States Supreme
46
Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A v. Hall.
Helicopteros involved a wrongful death suit brought in Texas based
on a helicopter crash in Peru. 4 7 The plaintiffs and decedents were not
Texas residents and the defendant was a Colombian corporation. 48 The
defendant's challenge to jurisdiction was rejected by the Supreme Court
of Texas. 4 9 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the defendant's
connections with Texas were not sufficient to allow a Texas court to assert jurisdiction. 50 All parties conceded that the claims against the defendant, arising from the aircraft accident in Peru, did not arise out of
the defendant's activities within Texas and therefore, the Court could
not exercise specific jurisdiction. 5 1 The Court analyzed the defendant's
overall business contacts and concluded that they could not establish
general jurisdiction. 5 2 Though the defendant's contacts with Texas consisted of accepting checks drawn on a Texas bank in payment for services, conducting one negotiation in Texas for a helicopter lease,
purchasing helicopters and equipment, and sending employees to Texas
for training, did not constitute doing business in Texas sufficient for gen53
eral jurisdiction.
A forum has general jurisdiction over a party when the party has
substantial connections to that forum. 5 4 General jurisdiction allows a
state to exercise jurisdiction over a party for any claim, regardless of
whether a particular claim is related to the party's contacts with the
state. 55 On the contrary, specific jurisdiction is exercised when a claim
arises out of a party's contacts with the state in regard to the defendant's
56
contacts with that forum.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

466 U.S. 408, 414-15, 418 (1984).
Id. at 410, 412.
Id. at 408-13.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 416, 418-19.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16.

52. Id. at 416.
53. Id. at 416-18.
54. William M. Richman, UnderstandingPersonalJurisdiction,25 ARz. ST. L.J. 599,
614 (1993); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9.
55. Id. at 614.
56. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 8.
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iii. Contacts /Fairness Two Part Test
The Contacts/Fairness test is often cited as deriving from the decisions in International Shoe, 5 7 World-Wide Volkswagen 58 and Burger
King.5 9 First, the forum state court must look at the extent of pre-litigation connections the defendant has with the forum state. 60 Second, the
forum state court must evaluate the overall reasonableness or fairness of
61
the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant, in light of the contacts.
Foreseeability is also relevant in this analysis.6 2 This test is extremely

63
fact specific.
The Supreme Court has provided five factors to consider when analyzing jurisdictional fairness: "(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the
forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the several states' shared interest in furthering fundamen64
tal substantive social policies."

iv. Long-Arm Statutes
After the Supreme Court's decision in InternationalShoe, state legislatures started to expand the scope of their courts' jurisdiction. Illinois
was the first state which created a statute expanding personal jurisdiction as broadly as due process would allow. 65 Since then, all states have

procured rules by which jurisdiction may be obtained over nonresident
66
individuals and corporations.
The main purpose of a long-arm statute is to gain jurisdiction over
nonconsenting nonresidents who could not otherwise be sued in the forum state. 6 7 However, a significant question arises when considering
who may use a long-arm statute as a plaintiff. "Most statutes do not in
terms exclude the possibility of use by nonresidents or foreign corporations and, in the absence of limiting language, courts generally have per57. See supra notes 8-12 for a discussion of InternationalShoe.
58. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of World-Wide
Volkswagen.
59. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of BurgerKing.
60. See InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. 310; see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
286; Burger King, 471 U.S. 462.

61. Id.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. 462.
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS, § 4.01 (1991); see also Currie,

The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. I'L.
L.F. 533, 537 (1963).
66. 1 Robert C. Casad, JURISDICTION IN Cvn.ACTIONS § 4.01 (1991).
67. Id, § 4.01[31[a].
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mitted nonresidents to avail themselves of long-arm jurisdiction." 68
There are, however, some long-arm statutes which restrict use to state
residents. Also, some statutes have provisions applicable only to resi69
dent plaintiffs.
Many long-arm statutes, such as the Marshall statute, allow jurisdiction to be obtained over one who commits a tort within the state or
causes tortious injury by an act or omission in the state. 70 As with any
statutes there are interpretation problems. Within the realm of tort language in long-arm statutes, the statutes may apply to acts which take
place within the state or acts taking place out of the state causing injury
within the state. However, "[wihen the defamatory statement and publication take place outside the forum state, long-arm jurisdiction may turn
upon whether the particular long-arm statute applies only when the defendant's act occurs within the forum state, or whether it is sufficient if
71
injury is sustained there."
2.

Discussion

For Marshall to exercise valid personal jurisdiction over Jacobs,
Fetty must show that Jacobs has sufficient minimum contacts which
make him amenable to jurisdiction under the Marshall long-arm statute
and that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Fetty must demonstrate that Jacobs purposely established minimum contacts with Marshall, availing himself of the protections and benefits of Marshall's laws
and that the exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
i.

Jacobs' Minimum Contacts Argument

Jacobs will likely rely on the cases from jurisdictions which apply
the view that sending defamation into a state after producing it somewhere else does not constitute the commission of a tortious act in the
receiving state. He will likely stress that for minimum contacts analysis
the tortious act occurs where the material is printed, not later published.
In Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp.,72 the court found that personal
jurisdiction could not be exercised over a California resident who wrote
and mailed a defamatory letter in California to a recipient in New York,
the forum state. 73 In Talbot, the defendant, a California resident, had
68.
Hockey
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. § 4.01[3][b] (citing Schuehler v. Pait, 238 S.E.2d 65 (1977) and Edmonton World
Enters., Ltd. v. Abrahams, 658 F. Supp. 604 (D. Minn. 1987)).
1 CAsAD, supra note 65, § 4.01[31[b].
Id. § 4.02[2].
Id. § 7.07[1][a].
522 N.E.2d 1027 (N.Y. 1988).
Id. at 1028-29.
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attended college in New York for four years, obtained a degree, and returned to California. 74 While at school she had witnessed objectionable
conduct by a coach at the university. 75 Upon returning to California after graduation, she sent a defamatory letter about the coach to the university which forwarded it to a New York newspaper, in which it was
published. 76 The New York court found the defendant did not engage in
purposeful activities within New York that bore a substantial relationship to the publishing of the defamatory letter, and hence personal juris77
diction was not conferred under the New York long-arm statute.
Similarly, in Tavoulareas v. Comnas,78 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals found that the act involved in a defamatory phone call
occurs in the state where the defendant makes the statement.7 9 The
court held that several allegedly defamatory phone calls made by a nonresident, received in the District, did not subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in the District.80 The court stated that mechanical reproduction of a defamatory statement on a telephone receiver in the
District fails to give a non-resident defendant physical presence in the
8s
District.
Likewise, in the present case, Jacobs may assert that he made the
statement at issue in Illinois. The message was then reproduced on a
computer screen in Marshall. He will argue that this should not constitute physical presence in Marshall for the purpose of defamation. Even
if he is considered to have mailed the message to the State of Marshall,
he will assert that he did not engage in purposeful activities with the
state or within the state which bore a substantial relationship to the allegedly defamatory statement.
Courts decline to assert personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, even where the consequences of statements may be foreseeable, if the forum state resident initiates the call which brings a nonresident's defamatory statement into the forum state.8 2 In McDonald v.
St. Joseph's Hospital, two hospitals in Georgia called the plaintiffs former supervisor in Tennessee for references four times. 83 The Tennessee
supervisor gave negative appraisals of the plaintiff, which allegedly
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1028.
Id.
Id.
Talbot, 522 N.E.2d at 1028-29.
720 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 194.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. McDonald v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 123, 125-26 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
83. Id. at 124.
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caused harm.8 4 The court granted the supervisor's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction holding that the phone calls were not initiated by the defendant and were isolated instances.8 5 Consequently, the
quality and nature of the defendant's contacts were not such that he purposely availed himself to Georgia law or could have reasonably foreseen
86
being haled into Georgia court.
Jacobs will argue that he did not establish minimum contacts with
Marshall or purposely avail himself because his allegedly defamatory
statement was made in Illinois and directed at an Illinois resident. In
Westhead v. Fagel,8 7 a California lawyer made allegedly defamatory
statements during a California press conference concerning a California
basketball coach. 8 8 A Pennsylvania newspaper later republished the
statements.8 9 The Pennsylvania court refused to assert personal jurisdiction, stating that the focal point of the harm and the statements was
the state of California. 90 Similarly, in the present case, the focal point of
Jacobs' alleged defamation is in the State of Illinois.
Additionally, in Hardnettv. Duquesne University,9 1 a Maryland resident sued a Pennsylvania university for negligence concerning an injury
sustained at a concert at the school. 92 The Maryland contacts, by the
university, were: (1) sending promotional literature to the plaintiff in
Maryland; (2) plaintiffs return of a completed application from Maryland; and (3) the university's letter of acceptance, received in Maryland. 93 The court found that general personal jurisdiction could not be
exercised over the school because the contacts were not sufficient. 9 4
Moreover, specific jurisdiction was not satisfied because the plaintiffs
claim did not arise out of the defendant's forum contacts. 9 5
Furthermore, in Pres-Kap v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,96 the
Florida Court of Appeals found that a travel agency in New York which
entered into a lease agreement with a Florida based information provider could not be subject to jurisdiction in Florida. 9 7 The plaintiff was a
Delaware corporation with its main billing and business office in Florida
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 126.
611 A.2d 758, 759 (Pa. Super. 1992).
Id. at 759.
Id. at 759.

90. Id. at 761.
91. 897 F. Supp. 920 (D. Md. 1995).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 921.
Id. at 923.
Id.
Id. at 923-24.
636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 1353.
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and a branch business office in New York. 98 The parties negotiated and
executed the contract in New York and the defendant called the plaintiffs New York office when there were problems. 9 9 The defendant's contacts with Florida were minimal; it made its lease payments and it
accessed the plaintiffs database in Florida, though there was not a showing that the defendant was aware of the location of the computer
database.' 0 0 The court indicated that the proper forum for the case
would be New York. 101
In Wheeler v. Teufel, 10 2 the court held the Minnesota long-arm statute did not confer personal jurisdiction over an Arizona defendant who
made defamatory phone calls from Arizona to persons within the forum
state.' 0 3 Minnesota's long-arm statute, however, separates the act from
the injury and requires that both occur within the state in order to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction. 10 4 The court said that the significant tortious act, uttering the words, was not done in Minnesota, but
in Arizona. 105
ii.

Fetty's Minimum Contacts Argument

Fetty will attempt to demonstrate that through his continued use of
the CanWeChat BBS Jacobs established substantial connections with
Marshall. In Condalaryv. Campbell,'0 6 Louisiana residents sued a New
York resident and a Virginia resident for damages resulting from the
purchase of dairy goats from Louisiana. 10 7 The parties had not united in
Louisiana, but had communicated by phone and mail a number of times
and formed a contractual agreement through those contacts.' 0 8 The
court found that specific jurisdiction was proper since there were sufficient minimum contacts which arose out of the transaction. 109 The court
said that even a single act directed at the forum state is enough to confer
jurisdiction if the act gives rise to the asserted claim."10
Fetty should assert that even one communication may subject a defendant to jurisdiction. In Brown v. Flowers Indus.,1"1 the court allowed
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1353.
Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353.
443 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 556-57.
1995 WL 555581 (E.D. La. 1995).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
688 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982).
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personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants based solely on one
tortious phone call made by defendants to the forum state.1 1 2 An agent
of the defendant corporations, who was an Indiana resident, called the
United States Attorney in Mississippi, from Indiana, and made a defamatory statement about the plaintiff. Although none of the defendants
were incorporated in Mississippi or had any other contacts in the state,
the court stated that the number of contacts is not itself determinative,
rather it is whether the nonresident defendant's contacts suggest that he
purposefully availed himself to the benefits of the forum state. 1 3 The
court emphasized that exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant corporation is in Mississippi's interest because defendant's agent called the state and committed an intentional tort." 4
Furthermore, the court found that to require the plaintiff to litigate elsewhere would be a great inconvenience because the plaintiff lived in the
15
forum state, as did one of the witnesses.'
Fetty should explain that even though Jacobs wrote the defamatory
statement and placed it on the BBS while in Illinois, the statement ultimately harmed Fetty's reputation in Marshall. Additionally, since receipt of the defamatory message by a third party constitutes publication,
a necessary element of the tort, a court could find that a defendant who
mailed a defamatory statement into the forum state could be found to
have committed a tortious act there.
In Fallang v. Hickey,116 the Ohio court exercised personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on a defamatory letter he wrote
and mailed to the forum state regarding the resident plaintiff"1 7 Defendant Long, a resident of South Carolina, sent the defamatory letter to
defendant Hickey, who resided in Ohio.1 8 Hickey distributed Long's letter to others." 9 The plaintiff sued Hickey and Long in Ohio and the
court held that Long's act constituted a substantial connection to Ohio
because it involved a resident of Ohio and most of the witnesses resided
20
in Ohio.'
Fetty can also rely on the "last event" test regarding jurisdiction
under long-arm statutes. With the last event test, "the place of a wrong
is where the last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor
112. Id. at 333-34.
113. Id. at 333.
114. Id. at 334.

115. Id.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

532 N.E.2d 117 (Ohio 1988).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
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liable." 12 1 In Gray v. American Radiator& StandardSanitary Corp., an
Illinois resident sued an Ohio valve manufacturer for injuries he sustained when a hot water heater exploded in Illinois. 12 2 The defendant
manufactured a valve in Ohio, then shipped it to Pennsylvania where it
was then incorporated into the hot water heater and consequently sold to
an Illinois consumer. 12 3 In finding jurisdiction, the Illinois court refused
to separate the negligent act from the resulting injury and concluded
124
that the tort occurred in Illinois.
Additionally, courts have held that a non-resident television station
is subject to jurisdiction under a long-arm statute when a defamatory
telecast is received in the forum state which is also a part of the station's
regular audience. 125 In Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., the court held that
Mississippi had personal jurisdiction over a defendant TV station located
in Louisiana because the station broadcasted its programs in Mississippi, where the plaintiff lived. 126 The court found that although the defendant was incorporated in Louisiana, maintained no offices and paid
no taxes in Mississippi, the defendant benefitted from Mississippi advertisers who pay to broadcast their goods and services on the defendant's
station. 127
Finally, at least one jurisdiction has found that electronic communications can establish minimum contacts. In Plus System, Inc. v. New
England Network, Inc.,128 a Colorado plaintiff brought a breach of contract action in Colorado against a Connecticut defendant. 12 9 The parties
had an agreement where the defendant was to process electronic fund
transfers by using a national network operated by Plus System through
its central computer in Colorado. 13 0 The court found that the defendant
purposely availed itself of the forum state's laws through regular computer communications which occurred by telephone to the central com13 1
puter in Colorado.
In July, 1995, the Minnesota Attorney General's Office released a
memorandum asserting that Minnesota courts have jurisdiction over
persons outside the state who transmit information via the Internet
121.
1961).
122.
123.
124.
125.
F.2d 3
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (Ill.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 763.
Casano v. WDSU-TV Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (S.D. Miss. 1970), affd, 464
(5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1144.
804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 118-19.
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knowing that such information will be disseminated within Minnesota. 13 2 The Attorney General's Office filed six lawsuits against promoters of scams and other illegal activities on the Internet, including
gambling, credit repair, pyramid schemes and snake oil.' 3 3 One suit,

Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., is still pending.' 3 4 The case alleges that a Las Vegas casino is planning to offer an illegal sports bookmaking service via the Internet which permits individuals to place bets
using a credit card.' 3 5 The casino challenges Minnesota's
jurisdiction.

1 36

Minnesota Statute Section 609.025 (1994), which is the Minnesota
general criminal jurisdiction statute, reads as follows:
A person may be convicted and sentenced under the law of this State if
the person:
(1) Commits an offense in whole or in part within this state;
or
(2) Being without the state, causes, aids or abets another to
commit a crime within the state; or
(3) Being without the state, intentionally causes a result
within the state prohibited by the criminal laws of this state.
It is not a defense that the defendant's conduct is also a criminal offense
under the laws of another state or of the United States or of another
country.
Minnesota courts have successfully used this statute to obtain jurisdiction over persons in varied circumstances. First, jurisdiction was
found over a person on an Indian Reservation who shot someone across
the boundary line in Minnesota.' 3 7 Second, it was determined that Minnesota had jurisdiction over an Iowa resident who mailed unlicensed
gambling equipment into the state. 1 38 Additionally, in the civil case
Minnesota v. Red Lake DFL Committee,' 3 9 the court determined that it
had jurisdiction over an Indian tribe committee which purchased a space
0
for political advertisement in a newspaper circulated in the state.14 It
seems that according to the Attorney General's Office, these principles
extend to Internet activities. Consequently, those outside Minnesota
who disseminate information in Minnesota via the Internet causing a
132. States Get Entangled In The Web, LEGAL TssME, Jan. 22, 1996, at S35.
133. Minnesota A G. Files Legal Action Against Individuals Involved In Computer OnLine Scams, PR NEWSWME, July 18, 1995.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Minnesota v. Rossbach, 288 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1980).
Minnesota v. Brown, 486 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
303 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1981).
Id.
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result to occur in Minnesota have been subject to Minnesota criminal
and civil laws.
3. Whether the Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the Defendant is Fair
and Reasonable in Light of the Due Process Clause.
Jurisdictional fairness should be evaluated by analyzing the following factors: "(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the
several states' shared interest in furthering fundamental substantive so41
cial policies.'
i.

Jacobs' FairnessArgument

First, Jacobs will discuss the burden of defending this suit in a forum in which he is not a resident. He should emphasize his lack of connection to the State of Marshall. He should also assert the travelling
inconvenience, financial inconvenience and the inconvenience involved in
needing a Marshall attorney to help with his defense. 142
In Madara v. Hall,143 the plaintiff, a California resident, sued for

defamation in Florida, based on an interview printed in a California
magazine, and distributed in Florida.' 4 4 The interview took place by
phone with defendant Hall in New York and the interviewer in California. 14 5 The Appellate Court found that Hall did not establish sufficient
minimum contacts to anticipate being haled into a Florida court. 146 The
court also found that because both parties would have to travel, and because few copies of the magazine were distributed there, Florida had little interest in this dispute between two non-residents. 14 7 Therefore, the
court held that the exercise of jurisdiction in Florida would offend due
48

process. 1

Similarly, Jacobs should stress that the State of Marshall has no
interest in adjudicating the dispute. Neither Fetty nor Jacobs is a resident of Marshall and neither party works in Marshall. Moreover, Jacobs'
141. See BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 477.
142. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-53 (1958) (holding Florida could not exercise jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee even though the trustee stood to gain or lose
nothing and the burden was minimal).
143. 916 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1990).
144. Id. at 1513.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1517.
147. Id. at 1519.
148. Madara, 916 F.2d at 1519.
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statement did not harm the state or any resident thereof; the state with
a real interest is Illinois.
In Shaffer v. Heitner,149 an Arizona shareholder of a Delaware corporation brought a shareholder's derivative action in Delaware against
officers and directors of the corporation, who never set foot in Delaware. 150 The plaintiff also filed a motion for sequestration of the personal property in Delaware, of individual defendants, who were nonresidents of Delaware. 15 1 The property consisted of stocks, options, warrants and various corporate rights of the defendants.'15 2 The defendants
issued a special appearance to quash service and vacate the order, asserting that the sequestration procedure did not accord them due process. 15 3 The Delaware courts exercised jurisdiction and the United
15 4
States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court stated that to assert jurisdiction based solely on the statutory presence of the defendant's personal property in the state violates
the Due Process Clause. 15 5 Moreover, the defendants' corporate holdings did not provide sufficient contacts. 15 6 The defendants had nothing
to do with Delaware and asserting jurisdiction in the state would be fun15 7
damentally unfair.
In Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court,15 8 the
Court held
that in a defective product suit arising from a sale of the product in the
forum state, the lower court improperly exercised long-arm jurisdiction
over a foreign manufacturer. 1 5 9 Although the Justices disagreed on the
sufficiency of contacts, the Court held 8-1 that California's jurisdiction
over the Japanese defendant failed the fairness test.' 60 Initially, the
case involved a California plaintiffs product liability claim against a
Taiwanese tire maker, who then interpleaded and brought an indemnity
cross-claim against Asahi, the Japanese valve-maker. 16 1 When the
plaintiffs claim settled, only the indemnity action remained. 162 In support of its fairness holding, the Court cited California's minimal interest
in the case, the substantial burden of California litigation on Asahi, and
149. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
150. Id.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192-93.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 195.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 216.
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
Id. at 108, 114-16.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Id.
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the ready availability to the Taiwanese tire maker of alternative
1 63
forums.
ii.

Fetty's FairnessArgument

Fetty must demonstrate that an exercise of jurisdiction by Marshall
is fair and reasonable. However, one must remember that the exercise of
jurisdiction rests more on the quantity and quality of contacts under the
minimum contacts and purposeful availment factor. To begin, Fetty
should contend that the burden on the defendant, of defending in Marshall, is minimal. She should stress the Supreme Court's decision in
Burger King, 164 where a Michigan franchisee was found to be subject to
jurisdiction in Florida, even though the burden of travel and expenses
seemed great. 16 5 She should also assert that the defendant is not an
alien so his burdens are much less severe than those sustained by some66
one that is sued in a different country.1
Next, Fetty should argue that the Supreme Court has supported a
state's interest in providing a forum for an injured non-resident. 16 7 In
Keeton v. Hustler, the Supreme Court found that New Hampshire had an
interest in the claim of the non-resident who was defamed through distribution of a magazine in New Hampshire.' 68 False statements harm
both the subject and the recipient and states have an interest in deterring such conduct within the state's borders. 169 Additionally, in Burger
King, the Court stated that where the nature or quality of a defendant's
contact warrants, a single act can support jurisdiction when it is con170
nected with the injury sued upon.
Similarly, in the present case, although neither party was a forum
resident, the Jacobs circulated his defamatory statement in Marshall
and the Fetty suffered injury in Marshall. In Computac, Inc. v. Dixie
News Co., 1 71 the non-resident defendant contracted with the resident
plaintiff for data processing services.' 72 The data was transmitted between the parties by telephone or mail.17 3 After processing was completed by the plaintiff, such data was relayed back to the defendant in
163. Id. at 114-15.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

471 U.S. 462 (1985).
Id. at 487-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 154-158 and accompanying text.
See Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770, 776-77 (1984).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 776.
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 n. 18.
469 A.2d 1345 (N.H. 1983).
Id. at 1346.
Id.
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North Carolina, by telephone.1 7 4 The parties entered two other related
contracts, but the defendant had no other contacts with the forum
1 75
state.
The plaintiff brought suit for payment under the contract.1 76 The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the weekly contact by telephone to New Hampshire and the delivery of information to New Hampshire satisfied the minimum contacts test.1 77 The court also found that
it was fair and reasonable to compel the defendant to defend the suit in
New Hampshire. i 78 Through the defendant's continued contact, the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into New Hampshire
179
court and the connections created an interest in the forum.
Finally, Fetty also has an interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief and the most efficient resolution of the case. She chose the
State of Marshall as the forum, indicating that it was a convenient location. Effective relief could not be obtained in Illinois because the limitations period had already expired. Additionally, Fetty's witness is a
resident of Marshall. Although a ready and convenient alternate forum
may outweigh a state's exercise of jurisdiction Marshall is convenient
and the state has an interest because the injury occurred in Marshall.
Consequently, Fetty will likely rely on the Supreme Court's holding
in Keeton to support her choice of forums. In Keeton, the fairness issue
was not clear because the plaintiff had no real connection with New
Hampshire and was not well known there.' 8 0 The plaintiff however,
picked the forum because of New Hampshire's six-year statute of limitations for defamation claims. 1 8 ' The Court addressed the minimum contacts and fairness questions and held the defendant subject to
jurisdiction. 1 82 Thus, the plaintiffs forum shopping did not preclude a
finding of minimum contacts or personal jurisdiction when the defamation made its way into the forum state.

B.
1.

DEFAMATION AND THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE

Background

Defamation is commonly defined as a communication which tends to
harm the reputation of another person, lowering him in the community's
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Cornputac, 469 A.2d at 1346.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1347-48.
Id. at 1347.
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773-74.
Id.
Id. at 781.
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estimation or which deters third persons from dealing or associating
with him. 18 3 Such a statement may be oral or written. 18 4 A prima facie
case of defamation consists of: 1) defamatory words; 2) publication or
communication of the words to a person other than the plaintiff; 3) falsity; 4) some degree of fault; and 5) resulting injury.185
Defamatory statements may be defamatory on their face or may
need additional facts plead to demonstrate the defamatory nature of the
statement.186 The recipient of the defamatory statement must reasonably understand that the statement refers to the plaintiff.' 8 7 However,
without specifically referring to the plaintiff, a statement may still be
actionable.188
Defamation embodied in physical form, such as written or printed
words, constitutes libel.1 8 9 Libel is either defamatory on its face or
through the establishment of additional facts.190 If a statement is
libelous on its face no special damages must be proven. 1 9 1 If a statement
is not libelous on its face but refers to "1) imputations of plaintiff engaging in criminal conduct or crimes of moral turpitude; 2) imputations that
the plaintiff suffers from a loathsome disease; 3) imputations adversely
reflecting on the plaintiffs professional or business activities; or 4) imputations that an unmarried woman is unchaste," injury to reputation is
presumed. 19 2 In cases of slander or spoken defamation, injury to reputation is never presumed unless the statement involves one of the four categories above. 193 Special damages must be proved for all other cases of
19 4
slander.
Before 1964, plaintiffs were generally required only to show that a
defendant's statement "subjected them to hatred, contempt, or ridicule." 1 95 However, in that year the Supreme Court decided in New York
Times v. Sullivan 9 6 to impose First Amendment restrictions on defamation laws. In New York Times case, the New York Times had published
183.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
184. Id. § 568.
185. Frank C. Morris, Jr., Privacyand Defamation in Employment, C108 ALI-ABA 577,
609 (1995).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568.
190. Morris, supra note 185, at 610.
191. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 569.
192. Morris, supra note 185, at 610-11.

193.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 570.

194. Morris, supra note 185, at 611.
195. Eric Walker, Defamation Law: Public Figures-WhoAre They?, 45 BAYLOR L. REv.
955, 956 (1993).
196. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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an editorial advertisement which accused the Montgomery Police Department of engaging in racial harassment. 19 7 The police commissioner,
Sullivan, sued and was awarded damages. 198 Although some of the accusations were false, reliable sources confirmed the story and the Times
had no reason to doubt the story's validity. 19 9 The Supreme Court reversed the state court's decision, holding that defamatory statements
concerning public officials require that the official show the defendant
made the statement with "actual malice," in other words, with knowledge
that a statement is false or reckless disregardfor the truth or falsity of the
statement.200 The actual malice standard serves "the First Amendment's
goal of promoting uninhibited, open, and
robust debate on the activities
20 1
of those holding the public's trust."
The Court then extended the "actual malice" standard to public
figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.20 2 The Saturday Evening Post
published an article stating that the plaintiff, athletic director at the
University of Georgia, and Bryant, the Alabama football coach, conspired
to fix a game between their teams. 20 3 The story's source was a man
claiming to have tapped into a phone conversation between the plaintiffs. 20 4 Stating that basing the story on one person's strange testimony

violated basic journalistic standards, the Court upheld the finding of defamation. 20 5 The Supreme Court ruled that a public figure also had to
20 6
prove a higher standard of fault.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,207 the Supreme Court defined a public
figure. 208 Gertz involved an attorney who had been defamed by the John
Birch Society. 20 9 The Court defined public figures as people who have
"assumed roles of [special] prominence in the affairs of society."2 10 The
court distinguished between pervasive public figures and limited public
figures. 2 1 1 The Court stated that some people achieve significant fame
or notoriety for all purposes and in all contexts. 2 12 Others, however, be197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 256-58.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 256-62.
Id. at 279-80.
Walker, supra note 195, at 957.
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 135-38.
Id. at 155.
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
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come limited public figures by voluntarily "thrust[ing] themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." 2 13 Thus, limited public figures are public
figures with respect to the range of specific matters for which they are
prominent.
The Court presented two main considerations that led to the requirement for a higher standard of fault in the defamation of public
figures. Most importantly, "public figures have voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury ....
because they have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies ....
214
Additionally, the Court said: "The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help-using available opportunities to contradict the lie
. . . public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication ... *"215 The Court observed, "[t]hus,
private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than... public
figures; they are also more deserving of recovery." 2 16 It is important to
note that the standard of fault for a private individual regarding a public
issue can be mere negligence.
In Gertz, a police officer had been prosecuted criminally for shooting
a young man. 2 17 The deceased's family had hired plaintiff to represent
them in civil litigation against the officer. 2 18 The Court said:
In this context it is plain that (plaintiff) was not a public figure. He
played a minimal role at the coroner's inquest, and his participation
related solely to his representation of a private client. He took no part
in the criminal prosecution.... Moreover, he never discussed either the
criminal or civil litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so. He plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this
public issue, nor did he
engage the public's attention in an attempt to
2 19
influence its outcome.
Since Gertz, few Supreme Court cases have addressed the issue of
the plaintiffs private or public figure status. 2 20 Moreover, in those cases
the Court found the plaintiff to be a private individual. 2 2 1 The cases also
add very little to the public figure analysis established in previous
cases. 2 22 However, the Court seems reluctant to declare public figure
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 344.
216. Id. at 345.
217. Id. at 325.
218. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
219. Id. at 352.
220. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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status as a result of being involved in litigation. 2 23
Time v. Firestone,224 for example, involved a highly publicized and
sensational divorce proceeding in which the wife even called press conferences to castigate her husband. 2 25 The wife was held to be a nonpublic figure. 2 26 Next, the Court concluded that a scientist who applied
for government assistance for his research was not a public figure. 2 2 7 In
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, Hutchinson sued a senator for allegedly defam2 28
atory statements made about his government-sponsored research.
The Court explained that Hutchinson did not voluntarily rise to the forefront of a controversy, but that he became a well-known figure because of
the defendant's statements. 22 9 Consequently, the Court concluded that
one who defames "cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense
23 0
by making the claimant a public figure."
Finally, in Wolston, the plaintiff sued Reader's Digest for publishing
a book which falsely listed him as a Soviet spy. 23 1 More than ten years
before the book was published, Wolston was subpoenaed to testify before
a grand jury concerning his aunt's and uncle's involvement in espionage. 2 32 For failing to appear he received a contempt conviction which
received short-term media attention. 233 However, at the time of the alleged defamation, he had dropped out of the public eye and had returned
to a wholly private life.2 34 The Court concluded that Wolston was not a
23 5
public figure, in spite of the media attention he had once received.
First, the Court held that Wolston's refusal to appear in court was not
the type of voluntary activity which establishes public figure status, even
though such an action is likely to invite media attention. 2 36 Second, the
Court concluded that engaging in criminal conduct, or being prosecuted
for a crime, does not establish public figure status. 2 3 7 It is clear that the
determination of such status is a question for the court.
223. Id.
224. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
225. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 455.
Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 134-36.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 135.

230. Id.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Wolston, 443 U.S. at 159-60.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 161.
Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166-67.
Id. at 168.
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Public FigureAnalysis

The Supreme Court established that the actual malice requirement
governs cases involving public figures, not private individuals. To determine whether someone constitutes a limited purpose public figure for a
defamation action many courts evaluate the factors as dictated in
Waldbaum v. FairchildPublications,Inc.23 8 In Waldbaum, the plaintiff,
who had been a supermarket industry executive, sued the publisher of a
2 39
trade journal article which discussed his termination from a company.
The article stated that his company had been "losing money the last year
and retrenching."240 The court found that the plaintiff was very active
spokesman in the industry and was a "mover and shaper of many of the
cooperative's controversial actions."2 4 1 He thrust himself into debate
over issues relating to the supermarket industry in attempt to influence
the policies of the supermarket industry.
The court held that the Waldbaum plaintiff was a public figure and
articulated some guidelines for determining public figure status: (1) consider the scope of the public's interest by isolating the public controversy;
(2) examine the plaintiffs role in the controversy and evaluate whether
the individual has voluntarily risen to the forefront of particular public
controversies which expose him or her to criticism; and (3) examine
whether the defamatory statement is "germane to the plaintiffs participation in the controversy." 24 2 Additionally, courts analyze the extent of
the plaintiff's access to channels of media communication, as discussed
24 3
in Gertz.
3.

Discussion

i.

Jacobs' Public Figure Argument

Jacobs will likely contend that Fetty satisfies all factors of the public
figure test. First, he should demonstrate that the public has a significant
interest in the topic of abortion and that Fetty played a crucial role in
one such discussion, thrusting herself into the controversy. For example,
in Maxwell v. Henry,24 4 an abortion protester filed actions, including a
defamation claim, against various parties concerning his arrest, incarceration and media reports of the incident. 24 5 The plaintiff was arrested
on a public street, in the vicinity of an abortion clinic and he engaged in
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1296-98.
Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294-95.
815 F. Supp. 213 (1993).
Id. at 215.
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an altercation with the police. 24 6 The court found that the broadcast by
the television station concerned a public controversy and that the plaintiff was a limited public figure. 2 4 7 Consequently, the court dismissed the
action because the plaintiff failed to establish "actual malice" against the
248
television station.
Similarly, in Wright v. Haas,24 9 plaintiff, a member of a civic organi2 50
zation, wrote a "letter to the editor" which was published in the paper.
The defendant wrote a response, also published, criticizing the plaintiff
and his organization. 2 5 1 In the plaintiffs defamation action, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was a limited public
figure because he (1) wrote a previous letter to the editor seeking to engage attention of the public, (2) made issue of his organization's composition, and (3) made himself an issue through labeling himself as a
25 2
radical.
Next, Jacobs should argue that his statement is not germane to the
plaintiffs role in the controversy. He should argue that his statement
was no more than "rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt" he felt toward Fetty's views about abortion. 2 53 In
Letter Carriersv. Austin, a postal union engaged locally in an effort to
organize the minority of letter carriers who had not yet selected the
union as their bargaining representative. 25 4 The union listed the names
of non-members in its monthly newsletter under the heading "List of
Scabs." 25 5 The newsletter defined a scab as a "two-legged animal with a
corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and
glue." 256 A scab is "a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his
class." 2 5 7 Several of the people named filed defamation actions against
the union and received jury awards which were upheld by the Supreme
Court of Virginia. 2 58 However, the United States Supreme Court reversed and stated that words such as "traitor" were "obviously used here
in a loose, figurative sense to demonstrate the union's strong disagree25 9
ment with the views of those workers who oppose unionization."
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id. at 215.
Id.
586 P.2d 1093 (Okla. 1978).
Id. at 1095.
Id.
Id. at 1096.
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974).
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at 267-68.

257. Id.
258. Letter Carriers,418 U.S. at 269-70.
259. Id. at 284.
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Finally, Jacobs should emphasize that Fetty has full access to the
media through the Internet. Jacobs should rely on Reuber v. Food Chem.
News, Inc.,260 and Colson v. Stieg. 26 1 In Reuber, a scientist employed by
the National Cancer Institute, received a reprimand letter from his su26 2
pervisor, Michael Hanna, which was eventually leaked to the press.
In his defamation action, the plaintiff had recovered, but the judgment
was overturned because he was held to be a public figure. 26 3 The court
focused on the plaintiffs access to the precise "fora where [his] reputation was presumably tarnished and where it could be redeemed," specifically scientific and public health sources of communication. 26 4 The
sources included journals in which he had frequently published and the
food-chemical industry newsletter in which the alleged libel was
26 5
published.
Similarly, in Colson v.Stieg, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
John Calvin Colson, a university professor, had sufficient media access
when an allegedly defamatory statement was made by Lewis Steig, Colson's boss, only to a university faculty committee. 26 6 The court focused
on the audience and the extent of the publication. 26 7 The court did not
address public figure analysis because the statement was a matter which
received first amendment privilege protection. 268 Nonetheless, the
plaintiff was still required to prove "actual malice" to recover. 2 6 9 The
court found that if the statement had been communicated to the general
public the plaintiff may not have had sufficient access to "channels of
communication to overcome or offset the damaging effect of defendant's
statement."2 70 This conclusion followed from the fact that, in such a situation, those who heard the statement would have "no other means of
2 71
acquiring knowledge" about the plaintiff.
In the present case, the other members of the bulletin board are the
only people to which the defamatory statement had been published.
Thus, Fetty had sufficient access to the exact "fora where [her] reputa2 72
tion was presumably tarnished and where it could be redeemed."
Moreover, relatively few people received the communication; the state260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

925 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
433 N.E.2d 246 (111. 1982).
Reuber, 925 F.2d at 707.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Colson, 433 N.E.2d at 249-50.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 249-51.
Id. at 250.
Colson, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
Reuber, 925 F.2d at 708.
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ment was not published to the general public. Therefore, Fetty could
have refuted the statements and cured any damage to her reputation
through her access to the exact media in which she was allegedly
defamed.
ii. Fetty's Public FigureArgument
Fetty will want to assert that although the public has an interest in
the topic of abortion, the public does not have an interest in the particular discussion taking place on the CanWeChat BBS. A public controversy is "more than a general public concern, more than a newsworthy
issue, more than a cause celebre." 27 3 According to the Supreme Court,
"[a] public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the public; it
must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or
2 74
some segment of it in an appreciable way."
In Firestone,most of the parties' divorce dispute occurred in a public
courtroom. 275 Press conferences were even held regarding the dispute. 2 7 6 However, the Supreme Court found that the public nature of
the private dispute between the parties did not elevate the dispute to the
2 77
level of a public controversy.
Similarly, in the present case, the dispute, although centered in the
public topic of abortion, was a private dispute between two people with
differing opinions. Newsworthy issues of general public concern are not
normally public controversies for purposes of the public figure doctrine. 2 78 However, BBS's and Internet news groups consist mainly of
discussions about these types of issues. 2 79 Consequently, depending on
the nature of the BBS and a member's influence, 28 0 members of most
boards seem unlikely to face the challenge of proving actual malice in a
273. Thomas D. Brooks, Catching Jellyfish in the Internet: The Public FigureDoctrine
and Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 461,
483-84 (1995) (citingHutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135; Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167; and Firestone,
424 U.S. at 454).
274. Id. at 484.
275. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 449-452.
276. Id. at 454 n.3.
277. Id. at 454.
278. Brooks, supra note 273, at 485.

279. Id.
280. The same statement may or may not implicate the public figure doctrine depending
on the members of the BBS and the type of BBS. For instance, if a statement is made
maligning fortune 500 companies and politicians which endorse a trade agreement the public figure doctrine would be applicable because the plaintiff would be a major player with
influence on government policy. However, if the individual allegedly defamed is an average

citizen on a board consisting of average citizens the doctrine does not seem to be implicated.
See Brooks, supra note 273, at 486.
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defamation case. 28 1
Next, Fetty will want to assert that her role in any discussion which
took place on the BBS was not at the forefront of the controversy. Courts
examine the "nature and extent of an individual's participation in the
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation," to determine an
individual's public figure status. 28 2 In other words, one's whose involvement is insubstantial to the controversy and its resolution does not assume the role required for public figure status. Here, Fetty could not
realistically have expected that through her conduct on the BBS that she
would have an impact which effected the issue of abortion in such a way
to make her a limited public figure. She was not in a position of power or
influence; she merely voiced her opinion concerning the abortion topic,
even though she spoke in a public forum.
Similarly, in Fleming v. Moore,2 83 the Virginia Supreme Court found
that a man who spoke twice at a planning commission meeting had insufficient influence over the others at the meeting and the commission to
be a public figure for all purposes. 28 4 At the planning commission meetings, the plaintiff expressed his concern that a housing project to be constructed by the defendant would create a pollution hazard. 28 5 The
plaintiff never gave interviews or spoke in another public forum. 28 6 The
defendant then published advertisements in which he depicted the plaintiff as a racist. 28 7 The court found that the plaintiff did not occupy a

position of power or influence, therefore he was not a public figure for all
purposes; nor was he a limited public figure since he did not organize
opposition to the project and he voiced his own interest. 288

Likewise, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,2s 9 a researcher sued a senator
for defamation. 2 90 The Court noted that the plaintiff had not voluntarily
risen to the forefront of a controversy, but that he became a well-known
figure because of the defendant's statements. 29 1 The Court said that one
who defames cannot, by his or her own conduct, make the victim a public
2 92
figure and use it for his or her defense.
Finally, Fetty should argue that access to the Internet and the
CanWeChat BBS do not provide someone media access as intended by
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 485.
Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167.
275 S.E.2d 632 (Va. 1981).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 637.
443 U.S. 111 (1979).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 135.
Id.
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the Supreme Court. Otherwise, anyone gaining access to the Internet
would constitute a public figure. Fetty should distinguish her case from
cases such as Waldbaum v. FairchildPublications,Inc.,293 Nadel v. Regents of the Univ. of California29 4 and Wright v. Haas.29 5 In Waldbaum,
the plaintiff was a very active spokesman in a particular industry, and
he shaped many controversial actions by thrusting himself into debate
over issues in an attempt to influence the policies of the industry. 29 6 In
Wright, the plaintiff wrote a letter addressed to the editor of a newspaper
seeking to engage the attention of the public in order to influence public
issues, defend his organization, make an issue of its composition, make
himself an issue through his own labeling of himself as a radical, and
addressing other issues including a city attorney's opposition to organi29 7
zation and rehiring practices of the city council.
In Nadel, protesters opposed the construction of volley ball courts in
a University park. 2 98 The protesters passed out fliers warning of violent
consequences. 2 9 9 Ultimately there were incidents of vandalism and
damage to the courts, confrontations and rioting.3 0 0 The plaintiffs were
active and vocal members of the protestinggroup who spoke at meetings,
wrote letters to the paper, the University and the city and spoke to reporters.3 0 1 During a suit in which the plaintiffs were named for damages
and injunctive relief, the defendants wrote articles allegedly defaming
the plaintiffs. 30 2 The court found that the plaintiffs became limited purpose public figures by thrusting themselves into the forefront of the controversy and by inviting publicity, speaking at city council meetings and
303
speaking to news media.
Fetty should also point out that in Firestone,30 4 where the divorce
proceeding occurred in a public courtroom and the parties held press conferences the plaintiff was not considered a public figure. 30 5 Certainly, in
our scenario Fetty does not have sufficient access to traditional media to
rebut any defamation to which she falls victim.

293. See supra notes 228-243 and accompanying text for a discussion of Waldbaum v.
FairchildPublications,Inc.
294. 28 Cal. Rptr.2d 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
295. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wright.
296. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1299-1300.
297. Wright, 586 P.2d at 1096.
298. Nadel, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d at 190.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 191.
303. Nadel, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d at 198-99.
304. See supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text for a discussion of Firestone.
305. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 455.
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OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW
The order of the Circuit Court of Lakeview County denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss is unreported and summarized in the Record
on Appeal. (R. 1-5.) The opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of
Marshall affirming the circuit court's decision is contained in the Record
on Appeal. (R. 1-6.)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
A formal statement of jurisdiction is omitted pursuant to § 1020(2)
of the Rules for the Fourteenth Annual John Marshall Law School Competition in Information Technology and Privacy Law.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED
The text of the following constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to the determination of this case are set forth in Appendix A: U.S.
CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; and Ch. 48 MRS § I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
On December 4, 1993, Respondent Jennifer Fetty and Petitioner
Robert Jacobs, both residents of Illinois, were engaged in a computer
generated discussion group called CanWeChat. (R. 2.) The CanWeChat
discussion group is a computer bulletin board system hosted on an Internet server located in Chicago, Illinois. (R. 2.) Through the use of a
computer and a modem, subscribers of online service providers have the
ability to log on to thousands of bulletin board systems. Upon log in, the
users electronically communicate over telephone lines with others who
have access to the same bulletin boards.
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The topic of the December 4, 1993 discussion was abortion. (R. 2.)
During the discussion, the litigants, as well as other subscribers, hotly
debated the controversial issue. (R. 2.) Not surprisingly, the discussion
took on a caustic tenor. Respondent alleges that Petitioner posted a
message stating "[a]s for Fetty's opinions on this matter, I'm not going to
let some woman who prostitutes herself dictate my standards of conduct
or morality." (R. 2-3.) David Bornmann, who was part of the
CanWeChat discussion group, viewed this message in Marshall and expressed dissatisfaction with Petitioner's posting. (R. 3.) On January 5,
1995, over a year later, Respondent filed a defamation suit in the Marshall Circuit Court of Lakeview County against Petitioner Mr. Jacobs.
(R. 1.) In her suit, Respondent alleged that the tort occurred in the State
of Marshall. (R. 1.)
B.

SUiMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On January 5, 1995, after the statute of limitations for defamation
had tolled in the state of Illinois, Respondent filed a complaint in the
State of Marshall. (R. 1, 3.) In her complaint she alleged that Petitioner,
"out of spite and ill will, published a defamatory statement about her in
Marshall, and elsewhere, which was reasonably understood as defamatory and which caused her injury in Marshall, and elsewhere." (R. 3.)
Respondent thus decided to pursue her cause of action in Marshall despite the fact that neither party, nor the bulletin board, had any relation
whatsoever with that state. (R. 2-3.)
Petitioner fied motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction and for failure to specifically allege that Petitioner acted
with actual malice. (R. 1, 3-4.) Circuit Court Judge Hanson denied Petitioner's motions, stating that Marshall could properly assert jurisdiction
on the basis of Marshall's long-arm statute. (R. 1.) Judge Hanson also
ruled that Respondent was not a public figure "by virtue of communicating through the Internet." (R. 1.) Petitioner filed an interlocutory appeal, which in the state of Marshall may immediately be taken on certain
issues of a case. (R. 1, 5.) Because of the substantial ground for differences of opinion and the controlling issue of law, Judge Hanson certified
the issues of personal jurisdiction and defective pleadings for immediate
review. (R. 1.)
Reviewing the questions of law de novo, the Court of Appeals of the
State of Marshall affirmed the circuit court's order denying Petitioner's
motion to dismiss. (R. 6.) On June 22, 1995, the Supreme Court of the
State of Marshall granted Petitioner leave to appeal the orders and certified the issues of personal jurisdiction and defective pleadings for review.
(R. 1, 7.) Both are issues of first impression in the State of Marshall. (R.
5.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Forcing Petitioner, as a private citizen, to litigate in the State of
Marshall violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Marshall Court of Appeals, in finding jurisdiction predicated on
Marshall's long-arm statute, erred in not undertaking a proper fundamental fairness analysis as required by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Fundamental fairness requires an inquiry into whether there
are substantial contacts with the forum state that would establish a defendant's reasonable anticipation of litigation in that state. Petitioner
has had no personal or business contacts with Marshall, receives no economic benefit from his Internet involvement, nor has he availed himself
of the benefits and protections of Marshall laws. Further, Marshall has
no unique interest in the litigation between Petitioner and Respondent.
Finally, subjecting Petitioner to litigation in the state would be overly
burdensome.
Jurisdiction is also improper if the defendant cannot foresee a risk of
injury in the forum. Because Petitioner could not foresee a risk of injury
based on his Internet communication, compelling him to defend a lawsuit there would thus be fundamentally unfair and violative of the Due
Process Clause.
Moreover, public policy prohibits the expansion of jurisdictional
boundaries to allow any computer communication, in and of itself, to potentially result in distant and unexpected litigation. This is especially
true when the litigants and the computer database itself have no connection with the forum state. Additionally, due process affords protection to
individuals like Petitioner from defending against forum-shopping plaintiffs who seek redress in a distant forum either to exact revenge or to
preserve actions which are time-barred in other forums. Because defending in the State of Marshall does not pass scrutiny under a fundamental fairness analysis, Petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction should be granted.
II. The First Amendment offers special protections for the free dissemination of ideas, particularly when their content address important
social and political issues. One such protection is the public figure doctrine which requires that those who voluntarily participate in a public
controversy, and have a means for rebutting attacks against them, must
prove actual malice when suing for defamation.
The Marshall Court of Appeals erred in failing to determine that
Respondent is a public figure required to allege actual malice. Her status as a public figure is supported by the public nature of the abortion
issue, the volitional extent to which she participated in the Internet debate, and the means of effective rebuttal to which she had access. By
willingly participating in a debate about abortion, one of the most contro-
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versial topics of our time, Respondent exposed herself to the harsh criticisms and confrontations that accompany such a dispute. Far from being
a private chat among acquaintances, the abortion debate Respondent
joined was conducted on a computer bulletin board on the Internet, a
forum accessible by millions. Her participation in a public debate about
an issue which has substantial ramifications for society at large warrants the application of the public figure doctrine. Because Respondent
failed to allege actual malice in her defamation claim, Petitioner's motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of Respondent's complaint should have been
granted.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL
ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS SUBJECT TO IN
PERSONAM JURISDICTION IN THE STATE OF MARSHALL
BECAUSE SUCH A FINDING IS VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The appellate court erred in ruling that Petitioner was subject to in
personam jurisdiction in Marshall. The decision of the lower court offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
Marshall's exercise of jurisdiction over Petitioner does not comport with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). Petitioner's mere participation on the
CanWeChat computer bulletin board did not give him "virtual and legal
presence in the State of Marshall." (R. 6.) Furthermore, the "defendant's allegedly defamatory statement on the CanWeChat BBS" that appeared in Marshall, (R. 6.), cannot be the basis for jurisdiction without
more substantial contacts with the state. The lower court should therefore be reversed and Petitioner's motion for dismissal granted.
A.

SUBJECTING PETITIONER TO JURISDICTION IN MARSHALL IS IMPROPER

UNDER A FUNDAMENTAL

FARNESS

ANALYSIS.

The lower court should have concluded that jurisdiction over Petitioner was fundamentally unfair. In finding minimum contacts pursuant to Ch. 48 MRS § I(A)(2), the court neglected its duty to consider a
proper fundamental fairness analysis. To assert authority over a nonresident defendant, a court must not only address the state's long-arm
statute, but must also balance additional factors that ensure that the
court's assertion of jurisdiction is fair. InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 31"0 (1945); see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985). The court of appeals erroneously concluded that personal jurisdiction over Petitioner was predicated on a tortious act being committed in Marshall. (R. 6.) Even if Petitioner's statement over the Internet
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amounted to actionable defamation, jurisdiction in Marshall violates
Supreme Court standards of "fundamental fairness."
Fundamental fairness is contingent on whether a litigant "purposefully availed himself" of the benefits and protections of the forum state so
that he might "reasonably foresee" litigating in that state. International
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. "Reasonable foreseeability" should additionally be
analyzed in light of how substantial the litigant's contacts are with the
forum state. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957). A court must also inquire into factors including whether a state
has a unique and vested interest in adjudicating a particular dispute and
whether litigation in a particular forum would be overly burdensome for
the defendant. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
When applying the criteria of a proper fundamental fairness analysis to Petitioner's situation, it is unreasonable to conclude that his one
posted message in Marshall via the Internet was sufficient to make jurisdiction in Marshall comport with Due Process principles. Petitioner
availed himself of no benefits or protections of Marshall, and had only
minor contact with the state. Not only does Petitioner have no reasonable expectation of litigation there, Marshall has no unique interest in
adjudicating the case at bar. Consequently, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the present case is inappropriate, and the lower court
should therefore be reversed.
1. Petitionerdid not purposefully avail himself of any benefits and
protections of Marshall, thus litigation in the state was not
reasonably foreseeable.
Petitioner had no contacts with the state of Marshall that could be
construed as purposefully availing himself of the benefits and protections
of the state. In International Shoe, the Supreme Court held that minimum contacts with a state must be determined by the relationship between the defendant and the forum state. 326 U.S. at 316. This
evaluation must be made in light of "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Id. The Court established that fairness emanates
from purposeful activities directed at a forum state that result in gaining
the benefit and protection of a forum state's laws. Id. at 319. These, in
turn, trigger a reasonable expectation that litigation may ensue in that
state. Id. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), reh'g denied,
358 U.S. 858 (1958). In Burger King v. Rudzewicz, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the "purposeful availment" requirement ensured that a
defendant would "not be hailed into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts." 471 U.S. at 475.
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Petitioner's contacts with Marshall are no more than random, fortuitous, and attenuated. They do not meet the "purposeful availment" standard that would give rise to a reasonable expectation of litigation.
Petitioner is not engaged in any business that affords him any protection
of the laws of Marshall, (R. 3.), nor does he have any continuous contacts
with the state except for the "few messages" posted on the CanWeChat
bulletin board. (R. 4.) Although commentary posted on a computer bulletin board has the potential of being read nationally or even internationally, there was no purposeful directing of Petitioner's comment to the
State of Marshall, and certainly no economic benefit derived from the
posting of the message. David Bornmann's receipt and acknowledgment
of Petitioner's comment was a random occurrence that does not meet the
"purposeful availment" standard set out by either InternationalShoe or
BurgerKing. As a consequence, Petitioner could not have reasonably anticipated litigating in that state.
Petitioner's contention that he has been unfairly expected to litigate
in an inappropriate forum is supported by the holding of World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen, a New York couple purchased a car from a New York dealership.
Id. at 288. While driving to Arizona, the couple was in an accident in the
state of Oklahoma. Id. The couple filed suit in an Oklahoma court
against the manufacturer, the importer, as well as the regional and local
automobile dealerships from New York. Id. In finding Oklahoma retained no jurisdiction over the regional and local dealers, the Court noted
that the New York defendants sold cars in a three state area that did not
include Oklahoma. Id. at 298. Because no legal or economic benefit was
derived from Oklahoma, the Court found no purposeful availment that
would cause the dealers to reasonably anticipate litigating in the distant
forum. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299. Personal jurisdiction
was found inappropriate and violative of Due Process. Id. This despite
the fact that one could reasonably foresee that a New York car sold in
New York could wind up in Oklahoma and conceivably cause harm. Id.
Similarly, while Petitioner could have foreseen that his message
would be read in forums other than his own, his conduct was not the type
of "purposeful availment" contemplated by World-Wide Volkswagen. Petitioner, like the New York retailers in World-Wide Volkswagen, has
availed himself of no benefits or protections of Marshall. He has no continuous contacts with the state nor has he derived any economic benefit
from the state. (R. 3.)
Various courts have denied jurisdiction where there are a lack of
business contacts or other continuous and systematic contact with the
forum state. For instance, in Johnson v. Sel-Mor Dist., the court found
no purposeful availment of a sales company that had only "sporadic" contact with the forum state, even though the effect of alleged defamation
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occurred within the forum. 430 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
In Johnson, a sales manager allegedly made misrepresentations about
an employee which prevented him from finding future employment. Id.
at 496. Although the alleged defamation had its effect in the forum
state, the defendant's other sporadic contacts did not amount to the kind
of purposeful availment that would lead him to reasonably anticipate litigation in the forum state. Id. at 498. In the instant case, Petitioner's
only conceivable contact with the forum state was an allegedly defamatory comment read over the Internet by Mr. Bornmann. Because his
comment was read in Marshall, it might be said to have an "effect" in
Marshall. Nevertheless, like Johnson, a comment having an "effect" in
the forum state does not establish continuous and systematic contacts
required for the type of purposeful availment necessary to confer
jurisdiction.
The court in Norris v.Oklahoma City University, similarly assessed
the need for substantial business contacts to satisfy the "purposeful
availment" test. 1993 WL 313122 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1993). In Norris,
the court held that the defendant law school did not "purposefully avail"
itself to the benefits and protections of California so that long-arm jurisdiction would attach. Id. at *1. The plaintiff in Norris claimed that the
defendant school had purposely directed activities at California because
it sent her law school transcripts containing allegedly defamatory statements to that forum. Id. at *2. The court reasoned that there was no
purposeful availment by the Oklahoma school because sending transcripts into a state was not an activity expressly directed at the forum.
Id. Likewise, Petitioner's single contact with Marshall can hardly be
viewed as being expressly directed at Marshall. The comment was sent
to Chicago, Illinois. Without some other purposeful activities directed at
the forum state, jurisdiction clearly would not comport with fundamental
fairness.
Finally, in Pilipauskasv.Yakel, an Illinois resident brought a claim
for injuries allegedly sustained while vacationing in a Michigan lodge.
629 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). In finding that Illinois retained no
jurisdiction over the defendant lodge, the court concluded that the defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits and protections of
the state of Illinois. Id. at 741. The court found this even though the
defendants made approximately 100 phone calls annually into the forum
state and purposely marketed in the state of Illinois. Id. The court
noted that these efforts at bringing Illinois residents to Michigan did not
amount to purposeful availment that would give defendants a fair warning they would be sued in the state of Illinois. Id.
The object of this litigation-Petitioner's single computer contact
through a telephone line-is far short of the continuous systematic contacts contemplated as necessary by Johnson and Norris. Moreover, it is
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far less than the hundreds of calls made and purposeful marketing strategy properly found insufficient in Pilipauskas. A significant business relationship is an important consideration in assessing the "purposeful
availment" component of the fundamental fairness analysis. Petitioner
had absolutely no economic contacts with the State of Marshall, (R. 3.),
that could be interpreted as availing himself of any protections or benefits of the state. Since his contacts with Marshall, economic or otherwise,
fall far short of what other courts have considered sufficient to constitute
purposeful availment, jurisdiction in Marshall is inappropriate.
Due Process shields defendants from having to litigate in forums
where it would be fundamentally unfair to do so. Potential defendants
should be able to reasonably anticipate or predict where they might be
subject to suit. See Harold S. Lewis, The Forum State Interest Factorin
PersonalJurisdictionAdjudication:Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV. 769, 803 (1982). Without any purposeful and continuous contact with Marshall, Petitioner could not have
reasonably anticipated litigation in that state. Compelling Petitioner to
defend in Marshall is violative of Due Process.
2.

Petitioner's communications did not amount to substantialcontact
with Marshall.

Telephone connections in and of themselves are not an adequate basis for long-arm jurisdiction. See Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). In Margoles, a Washington D.C. plaintiff sued a Wisconsin
defendant for defamatory statements made over the telephone to his office staff. Id. at 1213. The court held that the defendant, by virtue of
telephone calls into the forum state, could not have projected her presence into the forum state for purposes of that state's assertion of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1217. The court stated, "[u]nless we wish to
delve into a magical mystery tour of 'projecting presences,' we must find
that no jurisdiction can be afforded." Id. at 1218.
Petitioner is similarly situated to the defendant in Margoles, if, for
no other reason, because the Internet system is transmitted over telephone lines. Comparable to the Margoles defendant, he has absolutely
no ties, other than the telephone line, with the forum state. (R. 3.) In
fact, Petitioner, unlike the Margoles defendant, did not even direct his
communication into the forum state and had little control over where it
would be published. The CanWeChat bulletin board is hosted by a sysop
in Chicago, Illinois, (R. 2.), and is accessed in Illinois by participants using their computers to dial into that state.
Petitioner directed his communication to Illinois and it was only by
virtue of David Bornmann's dialing the same bulletin board that he was
able to read the message while in Marshall. No contact, telephone or
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otherwise, was directed at Marshall. This makes Marshall an even less
anticipated forum for litigation. To assert that Petitioner projected himself into Marshall because a Marshall resident dialed a computer terminal in Illinois would indeed be delving into a "magical mystery tour of
projecting presences." Margoles, 483 F.2d at 1218.
Defamation suits in general require substantial contacts before a forum state may assert jurisdiction. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
the Court held that the publisher of a defamatory article may be subject
to long-arm jurisdiction when there is a substantial circulation of the
article in the forum state. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). In Keeton, the plaintiff
was a resident of New York who claimed that she was libeled by photographs and comments that appeared in the publication. Id. at 772. The
plaintiff sued several Ohio corporations and a California resident involved in publishing the materials. Id. The suit was originally brought
in Ohio, but the statute of limitations had tolled. Id. at n. 1. The plaintiff
then brought the suit in New Hampshire, the only state in which the
statute of limitations had not expired. Id. The Supreme Court found
that the magazine's national notoriety and circulation constituted substantial contacts that were sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the forum
state. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773-74.
Similarly, in Calder v. Jones, the Court held that personal jurisdiction over the writers and editors of a defamatory article was proper when
the focal point of, and the resulting harm from, the allegedly libelous
article was purposefully directed at the forum state. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
In Calder, the defendants were both Florida residents whose place of
business was also Florida. Id. at 785. They wrote a defamatory article
that impugned the professionalism of a prominent entertainer whose television career was centered in California. Id. at 783. In finding California an appropriate forum, the Court determined that substantial
contacts were established by the intent to harm within the forum state in
addition to the large circulation of the article in California. Id. at 788-89.
Given these circumstances, the Court theorized that the writers had
every reason to expect they would have to litigate in California. Id. at
790.
Petitioner's contacts with Marshall are not substantial enough to
confer jurisdiction in the state. Unlike the defendants in Keeton and Calder, Petitioner had no circulation of an alleged defamatory statement,
much less the mass circulation in those cases. It is even unclear whether
anyone but David Bornmann read Petitioner's comment. Not even Respondent took the opportunity to respond to Petitioner's comment. (R.
3.) Moreover, the statement, "I'm not going to let some woman who prostitutes herself dictate my standards of conduct or morality," (R. 3.), is
hardly the type of purposeful, impugning attack contemplated by either
Keeton or Calder. Rather, it was a spontaneous comment made in the
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midst of a heated debate. Petitioner may have been making reference to
a prior comment of Respondent's or presenting his opinion about an incongruity in Respondent's stance on the abortion issue. Petitioner's one
ambiguous comment is markedly different than the defamation alleged
and mass circulated in Keeton and Calder.
It is also noteworthy that it is only Respondent's neglect in filing a
timely suit that has brought this issue before the Marshall courts. Petitioner, Respondent, and the bulletin board itself are all domiciled in Illinois. (R. 2.) Had the suit been filed in Illinois, there would have been no
question that the state retained jurisdiction. However, because the statute of limitations has expired in Illinois, (R. 3.), Respondent chose Marshall where the statute had not tolled. This is blatant forum-shopping
which has been condemned as an abuse of our judicial system. "[S]tate
courts [must] . . . resist such blatant attempts at shopping for the
favorable law of a forum that has no connection with the controversy
other than a ...defendant do[ing] unrelated business there." Harold L.
Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique,83 COLUM. L. REv. 772,
970 (1983). Although the Court in Keeton allowed jurisdiction even
though the plaintiff engaged in forum-shopping, Keeton is distinguishable because of tlh defendant's substantial contacts with the forum
state. These contacts do not exist in the case at bar. Respondent's efforts
at forum-shopping should be regarded as unfairly attempting to compel
Petitioner's appearance in an inconvenient and inappropriate forum.
3.

Respondent's defamation action is not sufficiently related to
Marshall.

The State of Marshall has very little interest, if any, in litigating the
dispute between Petitioner and Respondent. In Curtis PublishingCo. v.
Birdsong, the court expressed concern about extending the authority of
its courts over situations not sufficiently related to the forum state. 360
F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966). The defendant in Birdsong published an allegedly libelous article in the State of Alabama. Id. at 345. The writer of
the article was a New York resident and the article was edited in New
York City. Id. at 346. The content of the article concerned the state of
Mississippi and all of the plaintiffs were Mississippi residents. The only
contact with the forum state of Alabama was that the publishing company did business there. Id. at 345.
In finding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate
Due Process, the Birdsong court reasoned that there must be a rational
nexus between the fundamental events giving rise to the cause of action
and the forum state. Id. at 346. The events must give the forum state
sufficient interest in the litigation before it may constitutionally compel
litigants to defend in that forum. Birdsong, 360 F.2d. at 346-47. The
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court commented that the only interest that the forum state had was an
interest held by forty-nine other states: to protect its citizens against
reading libels distributed in its state. Id. at 347. The Due Process
Clause was found to prohibit such extensions of local power because a
state could otherwise extend its authority beyond its boundaries to matters not sufficiently related to that state. Id. at 348. This extension
would reduce the separate entity of the state to a mere fiction. Id.
Like Birdsong, the only contact that Marshall has with the present
case is that the alleged defamatory statement was published there. The
only interest that the State of Marshall may have had, similar to Birdsong, was to protect its citizens against reading libels distributed in its
state, and that interest in the litigation was held by forty-nine other
states as well. To that end, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Petitioner for contacts that were not purposefully directed at the forum
state would lead the court to extend its authority beyond state lines.
This extension of authority violates due process.
4. Litigating in Marshall would be overly burdensome for Petitioner.
Petitioner would be unfairly burdened by litigation in Marshall. A
court must consider the burden placed on the defendant before finding
jurisdiction appropriate. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978); see also Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987). In Kulko a nonresident father was subjected to jurisdiction for
modification of a child support agreement. 436 U.S. at 84. The father's
only contact with the forum state was the purchase of an airline ticket,
done outside the state, for his daughter residing within the state. Id. at
87. The mother asserted that he committed "a purposeful act outside the
state that caused an effect within the state," thereby conferring jurisdiction on the forum. Id. The Court, however, held that the exercise of in
personarnjurisdiction over the nonresident father would violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 85. The Court determined that "fairness to the defendant [is] an essential criterion in all
cases," and that "[no] reasonable parent would expect.., the substantial
burden and personal strain of litigating a child support suit 3000 miles
away." Id. at 92.
Although the Court in Kulko made reference to traversing 3000
miles, the focal point of the Court was not primarily the distance but the
hardship upon the defendant of litigating in a forum where he lacked
substantial contacts. Petitioner's only contact with the State of Marshall
has been well-documented as the fortuitous occurrence of a third party's
participation on a computer bulletin board based in Petitioner's home
state. In Kulko, at least one of the litigants resided in the forum state.
Here, neither do. This, in addition to the absence of any other substan-
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tial contact, would result in an undue burden even if Marshall is directly
adjacent to Illinois. Although Petitioner's undue burden in and of itself
would be insufficient to preclude jurisdiction, when balanced within the
whole of the fundamental fairness analysis, the scales weigh in favor of
denying jurisdiction in Marshall. Accordingly, Petitioner's motion to dismiss should have been granted.
B.

PETITIONER COULD NOT BE SUBJECT

As

THE RISK OF INJURY WAS

To JURISDICTION IN
NOT FORESEEABLE.

MARSHALL

Where contacts with a particular state are de minimis, jurisdiction
is improper if a defendant could not have foreseen that a plaintiff would
have been injured in the forum. See David I. Levine, Jurisdictionin Distant Forums: PreliminaryProceduralProtectionfor the Pressfrom Jurisdiction in DistantForums, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 459, 477 (1984). The issue
of foreseeability was examined in Church of Scientology v. Adams, in
which a California church brought a libel action in that state against the
publisher of a St. Louis newspaper. 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978). The
suit was based upon an article written, inter alia, about a Missouri
church of the same denomination. Id. The court determined it was not
reasonably foreseeable that any risk of injury would occur from circulation in California and, as a consequence, jurisdiction was inappropriate.
Id. at 898. The court found that California readers were not a principle
or even secondary target of the articles, nor was the plaintiff mentioned
in any of the publications. Id.
Without it being reasonably foreseeable that any risk of injury
would occur in a forum, commentators have argued that jurisdiction
should not be conferred on the state. Willis L. M. Reese & Nina M. Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of JudicialJurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REV. 249, 263-64 (1959). This is exactly the case with
Petitioner. Although Petitioner could have foreseen his message being
read both nationally and internationally, there was no specific targeting
of Marshall. Thus there could have been no reasonably foreseeable risk
of injury in that state.
Although individuals have been subjected to in personam jurisdiction for writing letters and sending them into the forum state, the "foreseeability of harm" analysis has been predicated on the purposeful
nature of sending letters into the forum. Catherine J. Wiss, Personal
JurisdictionOver Non-Resident Publishers and Authors: What Contacts
are Needed After Keeton v. Hustler and Calder v. Jones, 34 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1125, 1149 (1985). For example, in St. Clair v. Righter,jurisdiction
was conferred over defendants who mailed letters containing allegedly
defamatory statements regarding the president of a corporation. 250 F.
Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966). The court found the defendants' act of mail-
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ing letters into the forum state to be a "voluntary action ... which was
calculated to have an effect in the forum state." Id. at 154. Petitioner, on
the other hand, has exhibited no such purpose. In fact, he purposely directed his comments only to Chicago, Illinois, where the bulletin board
was hosted.
Moreover, commentators have acknowledged the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, the vigorous opposing views,
and the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. Caryl Wolfson Leightman, Robak v. United States: A Precedent-

Setting Damage Formulafor Wrongful Birth, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725,
733 n.47 (1982). The subject is predisposed to inflammatory comment as
it is "perhaps the most emotional and divisive controversy of this century." Anne D. Lederman, A Womb of My Own: A Moral Evolution of
Ohio's Treatment of Pregnant Patients with Living Wills, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 351, 360 (1994). The nature of the Internet debate which
provoked Petitioner's comment made it even less foreseeable that Petitioner could envision the emotionally charged exchange causing harm in
a distant forum. Consequently, the State of Marshall erroneously asserted jurisdiction.
C.

PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS
NOT JUSTIFY LIMITLESS JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES.

Do

Computer bulletin board participants, like Petitioner, should not be
subject to long-arm jurisdiction simply because technology enables
messages to be posted in distant locations. Modern technology raises important concerns regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction and
courts have addressed these issues when making jurisdictional determinations. In T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Sec. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, the court
affirmed that the use of banking facilities, as well as the use of mail and
telephone facilities, absent other contacts, did not meet the "minimum
contacts" standard and could not be used to exercise personal jurisdiction. 749 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1984). Similarly, the court in Resolution
Trust Corp. v. First of American Bank, held that Due Process prevented
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a bank that received two Automated Clearing House transactions initiated by another bank. 796 F.
Supp. 1333 (C.D. Cal. 1992). The court stated that "such technology
which makes banking services more accessible to customers does not
commit the bank to national jurisdiction without some other affirmative
act." Id. at 1336. The court was not willing to accept such an expansive
result.
In a similar line of reasoning, the Florida District Court of Appeal
held that an Internet connection did not satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Pres-Kap,Inc. v. System One Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351
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(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The plaintiff was a Delaware corporation that
owned and operated a computerized airline reservation service. Id. at
1351. The computer database, as well as the plaintiffs billing and main
business office, was located in Florida. Id. The plaintiff had a New York
office as well. Id. For a monthly fee, the plaintiff provided access to its
computer base through telephone lines to book reservations essential to
a travel agency's operation. Id. at 1351-52. The defendant, a New York
travel agency with its sole place of business in New York, leased computer terminals from the plaintiff and mailed the monthly fee to the
plaintiffs office in Florida. Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1352. The court held
that the Internet connection did not meet the minimum contacts test,
and further stated that conferring jurisdiction on individual users would
be "wildly beyond the reasonable expectations of such computer-information users, and, accordingly, the results offend the traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 1353.
Commentators have almost uniformly determined that the average
individual computer user should not be subject to in personam jurisdiction merely through use of a bulletin board. See, e.g., Michael J. Santisi,
Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.: Extending the Reach
of the Long-Arm Statute Through the Internet?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 433, 450 (1995). Subjecting individual citizens to jurisdiction is unreasonable because individuals are substantially less
prepared to deal with distant litigation than commercial entities. Id.
The court in Pres-Kap recognized this difference between a business
user and an individual using services provided by the Internet. The
court stated, "[1]awyers, journalists, teachers, physicians, courts, universities, and business people throughout the country daily conduct various
types of computer-assisted research over telephone lines linked to supplier databases located in other states." 636 So. 2d at 1353.
It is unthinkable that a lawyer using Lexis in a distant state would
be compelled to defend a suit in Ohio or in the forum of Lexis's choosing.
In fact, even when a court has conferred personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant by virtue of computer communications, it was done
only when there was purposeful availment and more substantial economic contacts. See Plus System, Inc. v. New EnglandNetwork, Inc., 804
F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992). The court in Plus System refused to disregard existing jurisdictional framework when confronted by cases involving technological complexities. Id. at 117-2 1. Personal jurisdiction must
still be predicated upon the overriding principle of fairness. Id. at 117.
Petitioner in no way "projected" himself into Marshall any more so
than an individual using Lexis projects himself into Dayton, Ohio. Moreover, Petitioner had no economic contacts with the forum state as were
found necessary in Plus System. Without these contacts, fundamental
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fairness requires the lower court be reversed and Petitioner's motion to
dismiss be granted.
Technology is playing a vital role not only in our daily lives, but also
in courts of law. Jurisdictional issues once thought inconceivable are
now regularly confronted by courts. Burgeoning technology has the potential of creating numerous jurisdictional horrors. Automated bank
tellers, home shopping capabilities, and fax machines all have the capacity to project an "electronically achieved presence" anywhere in the
world. Individual users of such technology cannot reasonably be expected to litigate in a seemingly infinite number of possible forums. This
is particularly true when the users have no notion of where their communications may travel. The Supreme Court of Marshall can readily avoid
these dilemmas and decide this matter consistent with the traditional
notions of fair play and essential fairness upon which in personamjurisdiction is predicated. As Chief Justice Stone commented in International
Shoe, without continuous and systematic activities, "presence [of the defendant] ... or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in
a state . . . are not enough to subject [him] to suit." 326 U.S. at 317.
Requiring one to "defend the suit away from his home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activity has been thought to lay
too great and unreasonable burden [on the defendant] to comport with
due process." Id. This concept must be applied despite developments in
technology and, as a consequence, jurisdiction over Petitioner should be
found violative of due process. The lower court should therefore be reversed and Petitioner's motion to dismiss granted.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING RESPONDENT'S CLAIM
BECAUSE SHE IS A PUBLIC FIGURE WHO
FAILED TO ALLEGE ACTUAL
MALICE.

The appellate court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss
because Respondent is a public figure required by the First Amendment
to allege and prove actual malice to sustain a defamation action. Respondent became a public figure by virtue of her willful participation in a
debate about abortion on the Internet. Abortion, one of the most divisive
issues currently facing the nation, is a public controversy. The nature
and extent of Respondent's participation in the debate indicates that she
invited attention and comment by thrusting herself to the forefront of
that controversy. It is the duty of this court to apply traditional First
Amendment protections in favor of free debate on public controversies. A
review of the instant case indicates that the actual malice standard governing defamation actions by public figures is applicable to Respondent's

1996]

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

action against Petitioner. Therefore the decision of the lower court
should be reversed and Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's complaint should be granted.
The First Amendment precludes public officials from recovering
damages in a defamation action absent an allegation and clear and convincing proof "that the statement was made with 'actual malice,' that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974);
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). This standard
also applies to public figures. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323, 345; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967). Public figures include those
individuals who thrust themselves to the forefront of a particular public
controversy, thereby inviting attention and comment. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345.
The reason for imposing a higher burden of proof on public figures
like Respondent, as opposed to purely private individuals, is clear. It is
to ensure "that debate on public issues [is] uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. Even before the Court's
landmark ruling in New York Times, this nation has regarded the unfettered exchange of ideas as inextricably linked with the very foundations
of democracy. These sentiments are evident in early decisions of the
Supreme Court. In Thornhill v. Alabama, the Court stated that
"[fireedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their period." 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). The Court has likewise instructed
that "it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful
change is effected." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
If we are to enjoy uninhibited and robust debate about public controversies such as abortion, as well as the free dissemination of truth and
opinion, society must afford a certain amount of "strategic protection" to
statements which might otherwise be defamatory. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
342; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272. The actual malice standard permits such protection by affording a constitutional "breathing space" to
allegedly defamatory statements made about public figures. Gertz, 418
U.S. at 342. It guards against the chilling of free expression through
sanction and self-censorship, consequences brought on by defamation litigation. Id.
The exchange between Petitioner and Respondent over the Internet
is precisely the kind of speech that the First Amendment is designed to
protect. The Internet, often referred to as the "world-wide web," is the
largest electronic communication service in the world. Mark A. Kassel &
Joanne Kane Kassel, Don't Get Caught in the Net: An Intellectual Prop-
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erty Practitioner'sGuide to Using the Internet, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 373, 373 (1995). Because the Internet is a medium of
speech, Petitioner, who also participated in the abortion debate, is entitled to traditional First Amendment protections. Accordingly, Respondent must allege actual malice in her defamation action against
Petitioner.
A.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT RESPONDENT WAS
NOT A PUBLIC FIGURE FOR PURPOSES OF HER DEFAMATION
ACTION.

The public or private status of a defamation plaintiff is critical in a
court's determination of the weight to be allocated between the competing interests of the state in protecting an individual's reputation on one
hand, and free speech on the other. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. When someone becomes a public figure, imposing the actual malice standard is warranted because they, unlike private individuals, have greater access to
the media to correct misstatements about them. Id. Conversely, private
individuals are generally not privy to those means of redress. Id. Furthermore, public figures, unlike private persons, accept and run the risk
that others, in analyzing and commenting on public controversies, "will
focus on them and, perhaps, cast them in an unfavorable light." Id. at
345. Respondent's involvement in a public controversy via the Internet
transformed her from a private individual to a public figure. Her online
participation in the CanWeChat discussion group made the state's interest in protecting uninhibited, robust, and wide-open public debate more
compelling than any interest the state may have in guarding her
reputation.
The Gertz Court defined alternate theories by which an individual
may become a public figure:
[I]t may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no
purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain
this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly,
those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particularpublic controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added). There are then, two distinct
categories of public figures; individuals of such pervasive notoriety that
they are public figures for all purposes, and individuals like Respondent
who are drawn into or who voluntarily inject themselves into a specific
public controversy. The latter is commonly referred to as a "limited purpose public figure." Waldbaum v. FairchildPublications,Inc., 627 F.2d

1996]

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980) (finding CEO in
the supermarket industry a "limited purpose public figure").
This court is vested with the authority to determine whether Respondent is a public figure as a matter of law. See Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966). In deciding whether a defamation plaintiff is a
public figure, courts should engage in a fact-sensitive examination concerning the character of the controversy and "the nature and extent of
[Respondent's] participation in the particular controversy that gave rise
to the alleged defamation." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44.
The first consideration, which calls upon the court to determine the
character of the controversy, turns upon (1) whether the controversy preexisted the alleged defamation, and (2) whether the outcome of the controversy effects those not directly participating in it in some appreciable
way. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1292-96, noted with approval in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 246 n.3 (1986). If the answer to
both inquiries is affirmative, the issue is a public controversy.
The second consideration, the nature and extent of the plaintiffs
role in the controversy, focuses upon the voluntariness of the plaintiffs
involvement, and should include notice of whether the plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111 (1979); see also Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, 37 F.3d
1541 (4th Cir. 1994). The more voluntary the plaintiffs participation in
the public controversy, and the more accessible the means to effective
communication, the more likely the plaintiff is a limited purpose public
figure as a matter of law. Applying these criteria to the instant case can
only lead to the conclusion that Respondent is a voluntary, limited purpose public figure as a matter of law.
During its brief consideration of the issue, the Marshall Court of Appeals neglected its duty to undergo a fact-sensitive analysis about the
particular controversy in which Respondent engaged. An examination of
the nature and extent of her role in that controversy is also notably absent from the appellate court's opinion. This violates the direction of the
Supreme Court in Gertz and its progeny. The lower court ignored this
direction and summarily dismissed, without elaboration, the contention
that one may become a public figure "merely because of her participation
in a discussion of a controversial issue widely published on the Internet."
(R. 6.) In its scant treatment of the issue, the court failed to recognize
that electronic communication services have become an easily accessible
forum for public debate. Any individual with a computer and modem
may participate in public controversies to such an extent so as to acquire
the status of a limited purpose public figure.
Commentators reflecting on the application of the First Amendment
to electronic communication services have recognized their role in the
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free marketplace of ideas. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Emerging Media
Technology and The First Amendment: Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104
YALE L.J. 1639, 1668 (1995) (quoting Mike Godwin, Legal Counsel for
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, "The world of the networks is a true
democracy, your influence is measured not by wealth or position, but by
how well you write and reason.") A proper analysis of the instant case
indicates that Respondent, like many others, chose the Internet as the
medium for injecting her ideas into a public controversy. The nature and
extent of her participation in that controversy was such that she became
a limited purpose public figure.
1.

A debate about abortion on the Internet constitutes a public
controversy.

Respondent's online participation in the CanWeChat abortion debate was a public rather than private concern. "If [an] issue was being
debated publicly [prior to the alleged defamation], and if it [has] foreseeable and substantial ramifications for nonparticipants, it [is] a public
controversy." Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296.
Little reflection is required to arrive at the conclusion that the abortion debate pre-existed Petitioner's participation in the CanWeChat discussion group in November and December, 1993. (R. 2.) In 1973, the
Supreme Court recognized a woman's right to choose an abortion before
fetal viability. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), modified sub nom, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) Since then, a heated debate has raged across the nation,
dividing people according to their legal, moral, and political convictions.
The abortion debate also has foreseeable and substantial ramifications
for nonparticipants. Doctors have been murdered for their willingness to
perform the procedure. Stephen Braun, Abortion's Wary Line of Defense,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at Al. Women seeking access to family planning clinics are harassed or denied access by abortion protestors. Laura
Griffin, Violence in the Name of God, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 23,
1994, at 1A. Police forces are overburdened with monitoring pro-choice
and pro-life demonstrations. Id. Clearly, the abortion controversy effects those not directly involved in the debate in an appreciable way.
Abortion, perhaps more than any other issue, is a public controversy.
In light of other issues courts have recognized as public controversies, reasonable minds would conclude that the abortion debate is even
more worthy of the title. Consumer, health, and environmental issues
are commonly found to be public controversies. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), affd, 466 U.S.
485 (1984). For instance, an ongoing debate about the carcinogenic effect
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of pesticides is a public controversy. Reuber v. Food Chemical News,
Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1991). A utility company's refusal to
allow public access to its cooling lake for recreational purposes has been
recognized as a public controversy. Knudsen v. Kansas Gas & Electric
Co., 807 P.2d 71 (Kan. 1991). A community's concerns about the rates of
a municipally owned utility may also constitute a public controversy.
Wright v. Haas, 586 P.2d 1093 (Okla. 1978).
Even seemingly private family matters can become public controversies if they heighten social awareness. In Foretich v. Capital Cities/
ABC, Inc., the court, in determining whether the plaintiffs were limited
purpose public figures, concluded that a highly publicized child custody
battle was a public controversy. 37 F.3d 1541 (4th Cir. 1994). In Foretich, the grandparents of a child at the center of the custody litigation
filed a defamation action against ABC for a docudrama in which they
were referred to as "abusers." Id. at 1541-43. The court explained that
the custody dispute was not merely a personal matter which captured
the voyeuristic attention of the public. Id. Rather, it was a public controversy which raised social awareness about child abuse allegations and
the negative ramifications of lengthy custody disputes. Id. Cf Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (finding publicized divorce of socially
prominent couple not the sort of "public controversy" to which Gertz applies). The plaintiffs were ultimately held to be private figures notwithstanding the controversy because their public statements were not
voluntary but made in defense of accusations that they had abused their
grandchild. Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1543.
That the abortion debate is a public controversy is uncontested and
no reasonable court would find otherwise. The appellate court conceded
as much by stating Respondent was involved "in a discussion of a controversial issue widely published on the Internet." (R. 6.) Indeed, Petitioner and Respondent were engaged in a debate of far greater
magnitude than the quality of consumer goods or the rate of local utilities. Like the issues addressed in Foretich, the abortion debate on
CanWeChat heightened social awareness as to the complexities of the
issue. The discussion was representative of the colliding legal and moral
positions on abortion prevalent in the general public. The messages
posted by the parties also demonstrate the passion with which individuals respond when challenged as to the propriety of their view. Distinguished from the plaintiffs in Foretich, Respondent did not make her
statement in self-defense of any accusation of illegal activity.
Abortion, an intrinsically private decision about procreation, has
generated a public controversy of enormous proportions. Respondent debated this topic undoubtedly aware of its magnitude. The special protections for speech relating to public issues stem from the belief that the
First Amendment was intended to allow the free exchange of ideas to
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bring about desired political and social changes. Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5
(1949). Those seeking to influence opinions on abortion via the Internet
have the ability to bring about political or social change through peaceful
means. The debate in which Petitioner was engaged and his statements
therein should be granted First Amendment protection, lest censorship
of discussion about volatile public issues result in the eventual violent
outburst of otherwise suppressed opinions.
2. Respondent voluntarily thrust herself into the abortion controversy
and, by virtue of her participationin the debate on the Internet,
had access to effective means of rebuttal.
The lower court erred in not conducting a thorough analysis of Respondent's role in the abortion controversy. Such an inquiry is required
when determining the public or private status of a defamation plaintiff.
See Clark v. American BroadcastingCo., Inc., 684 F.2d 1208, 1218 (6th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983); Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW, §§ 12-13 (2d ed. 1988). In considering the
plaintiffs role in a public controversy, the court should examine the voluntariness of the plaintiffs presence in the controversy, and take notice
of whether the plaintiff had available a means of rebuttal that reduces
the need for litigation. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 433 U.S. 111, 135-136;
see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
When individuals voluntarily assume a role in a public controversy,
they, by their own will, expose themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443
U.S. 157, 164 (1979). They accept and run the risk that others, in analyzing and commenting on public controversies, "will focus on them and,
perhaps, cast them in an unfavorable light." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45.
When a plaintiff has ready access to a means of effective communication,
courts prefer rebuttal of defamatory speech over a resort to litigation.
Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708 (4th Cir. 1991)
citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344). An application of these considerations to
the instant case indicates that Respondent willingly joined a debate
about a controversial issue, thereby running the risk that others would
defame her. The Record also demonstrates that Respondent, by virtue of
her participation in the online discussion, literally had the instrument of
rebuttal at her fingertips. Her decision to file suit, rather than challenge
Petitioner's speech, is particularly inappropriate given her voluntary
participation in a debate likely to evoke heated, confrontational
comments.
Persons like Respondent who choose to write about public controversies become limited public figures, that is, public figures with respect to
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the issues they write about. For instance, a free-lance journalist who
wrote a critical article about a utility company was determined to be a
limited purpose public figure. Knudsen v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co.,
807 P.2d 71, 78 (Kan. 1991). In reaching its decision, the court explained
that as a free-lance writer, the plaintiff was free to choose any topic to
write about. Id. In choosing to write an article about the utility company, the plaintiff voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy,
thereby inviting attention and comment. Id. at 78. Notably, the defendants' allegedly defamatory statements went beyond criticizing the plaintiffs article and attacked the plaintiff personally, by saying he was
"will[ing] . . . to print untrue information and to distort it to make an
adversarial position." Id. at 74. Even so, the court stated that "[plaintiff] is in no position to complain just because [defendant's] opinion, comments, or criticisms are adverse to his article." Id. at 78. Interestingly,
the court went on to state that, even had the plaintiff retained his status
as a "private individual," he was required to prove actual malice because
his article addressed an issue of public concern. Knudsen, 807 P.2d at 79
citing Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985).
Like the plaintiff in Knudsen, Respondent voluntarily injected herself into the abortion debate and, having done as much, is in no position
to complain simply because Petitioner's message was critical of her. The
Knudsen opinion also demonstrates that, because Respondent's comment
about abortion addressed a matter of public rather than private concern,
she may be required to allege actual malice on that basis alone.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma followed a rationale similar to
Knudsen in finding that a defamation plaintiff became a limited purpose
public figure because he wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper.
Wright v. Haas, 586 P.2d 1093, 1093 (Okla. 1978). The plaintiffs letter
addressed a controversy surrounding increasing rates of a municipally
owned utility and criticized the former city attorney. Id. at 1094. The
former city attorney responded in kind, referring to the plaintiff as a radical who "participat[ed] in activities ... which, but for the protection of
highway patrol troopers and the national guard, would have resulted in
the fire-bombing of at least one book store and the armory." Id. In finding that the plaintiff voluntarily injected himself into the vortex of a public controversy, the court explained that the plaintiffs letter to the editor
"sought to engage the public's attention to influence public issues." Id. at
1096. In reaching its decision that the plaintiff was a limited public figure, the court found significant that both parties wrote and had published letters to the editor, thereby establishing a likelihood of rebuttal.
Id.
By posting the message voicing her "firm opposition to abortion on
religious and moral grounds," (R. 2.) Respondent likewise voluntarily in-

622

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIV

jected herself into the vortex of a public controversy. Her message was
essentially an electronic editorial by which she engaged the participants'
attention in an attempt to influence the debate. As a voluntary participant in the online debate, Respondent, like the plaintiff in Wright, ran
the risk that others commenting on the issue might cast her in an unfavorable light.
Debates are inherently confrontational, calling upon their participants to denigrate others' arguments to fortify their own. When there
exists a likelihood of rebuttal between a defamation plaintiff and defendant, the court is more likely to conclude that the plaintiff is a public figure for the limited range of issues in which he has involved himself.
Wright, 586 P.2d at 1096. Although a medium of effective communication was readily accessible to Respondent, she neither requested a retraction nor responded to Petitioner's statement, opting instead to take
the disfavored action of filing suit.
When people have an effective means of disseminating information
and rehabilitating their reputation at their disposal, filing a defamation
claim is an inappropriate course of action. Reuber, 925 F.2d at 708 (citingHutchinson,443 U.S. at 135); see also Colson v. Stieg, 433 N.E.2d 246
(Ill. 1982). In Reuber, a scientist who was allegedly defamed by his employer was found to be a limited public figure. 925 F.2d at 704. The
plaintiff had published articles in the same scientific newsletter in which
his employers tarnished his reputation. Id. In arriving at the conclusion
that the plaintiff was a public figure, the court relied on his significant
access to channels of communication, both before and during the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements. Id. at 708. Because he had
ample opportunity to redeem his reputation through the same medium
in which he was allegedly defamed, the court disapproved of the plaintiffs choice to file suit. Id.
Like the plaintiffs in Wright and Reuber, Respondent had access to
the same medium of communication by which she claims she was defamed. Commentators have suggested that when defamation plaintiffs
subscribe to the same computer bulletin board in which they are defamed, they have sufficient access to redeem their reputations. See
Thomas D. Brooks, CatchingJellyfish in the Internet: The Public Figure
Doctrine and Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 461 (1995). There is no evidence to indicate Respondent terminated her connection to the Internet at anytime after Petitioner's allegedly defamatory message was posted. The unique
structure of computer bulletin boards allows users to immediately post a
rebuttal, bypassing traditional obstacles like editors of print media. Id.
at 467. Any alleged injury to Respondent's reputation could have been
cured by her own initiative in the very same forum where she was alleg-
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edly defamed. Opting to commence legal action against Petitioner was
therefore inappropriate.
B.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS
REQUIRED TO ALLEGE ACTUAL MALICE.

Respondent is a public figure as a matter of law with respect to her
participation in the abortion debate on the Internet. The New York
Times and Gertz rule of law requires such plaintiffs to plead and prove
actual malice to maintain a defamation action. Respondent is precluded
from proceeding with her defamation claim because she failed to allege
actual malice in her complaint against Petitioner.
By allowing Respondent's complaint to proceed absent an allegation
of actual malice, the lower court has chilled the free exchange of ideas on
the issue of abortion, a matter of significant public importance. When
reviewing defamation cases, an appellate court has an obligation to
make an independent examination of the record as a whole to ensure
that the final judgment does not infringe upon constitutionally protected
speech. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). It is,
therefore, within this court's discretion to apply the actual malice standard, even if it does not find that Respondent is a public figure as a matter of law, on the single basis that the speech between Petitioner and
Respondent involved a matter of public concern. Knudsen, 807 P.2d at
79 (interpreting Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 749 (plurality)); see also Cynthia
L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
In the interest of protecting uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate on
public issues, this court should impose the actual malice standard on Respondent due to her public figure status or, in the alternative, because
she engaged in debate about a matter of public concern.
The record demonstrates that Respondent was required to plead
with the burden of pleading actual malice. Because Respondent failed to
do so, Petitioner's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the complaint
should have been granted. Therefore, the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this
court reverse the appellate court's decision and grant Petitioner's Motions to Dismiss.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Petitioner
Aaron Reber
Rachelle Zidar
Todd Schrader
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY
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APPENDIX
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, amend. I.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, amend.

XIV, § 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to

the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES, MARSHALL LONG-ARM STATUTE,

Chapter

48.
I. Personal Jurisdiction by Acts of a Non-Domiciliary.
A. Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries,
their administrators or executors, as to courses of action which arise
from conduct enumerated in this section, who in person or through an
agent:
1) conduct or transact business within the state of Marshall;
2) commit a tortious act within the state of Marshall; or
3) commit a tortious act outside the state of Marshall which causes in-

jury to persons or property within the state of Marshall, if he or she
(a) regularly conducts or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue

from services rendered or goods consumed or used in the state of
Marshall, or
(b) expects or should reasonably expect his or her conduct to
have consequences in the state of Marshall and derives substantial
revenue from the interstate or international commerce.
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No. 95-1481
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF MARSHALL
JENNIFER FETTY,
Respondent,
V.

ROBERT JACOBS,
Petitioner.
ON APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE COURT
OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
John Matney
Carmen Symes
Laura Underwood
Attorneys for the Respondent
SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER THE MARSHALL COURT MAY PROPERLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY EXERCISE JURISDICTION UNDER THE MARSHALL LONG-ARM STATUTE TO REDRESS INJURIES THAT WERE
THE FORESEEABLE RESULT OF DEFAMATORY REMARKS PURPOSEFULLY DIRECTED TOWARD THE CITIZENS OF MARSHALL.
II. WHETHER JENNIFER FETTY IS A LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC
FIGURE, AS REQUIRED BY CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS,

628

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

(Vol. XIV

BASED SOLELY ON HER PARTICIPATION IN THE CANWECHAT
DISCUSSION GROUP ON THE INTERNET WHEN:
1. SHE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN A PUBLIC CONTROVERSY;
2. SHE DID NOT ASSUME A POSITION OF PROMINENCE IN A
PUBLIC CONTROVERSY SUCH THAT SHE COULD INFLUENCE ITS RESOLUTION; AND
3. SHE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ACCESS TO A PUBLIC
MEDIA SOURCE THROUGH WHICH SHE COULD ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO THE DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS.
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The statutory provisions relevant to the determination of this case
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Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is set out in the
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Respondent Jennifer Fetty resides in Peoria, Illinois, where she
works as a convenience store cashier. (R. at 2.) She enjoys computer use
as a hobby and has access to the Internet' through an on-line service
provider. (R. at 2.) Ms. Fetty's use of the Internet resulted in her introduction to Petitioner Jacobs.
Jacobs is an active computer user who resides in Addison, Illinois.
He works as a computer salesman, a position requiring a developed understanding of computer systems. (R. at 2.) As part of his computer use,
he subscribes to a computer service which provides access to the Internet. (R. at 2.)
The paths of Jennifer Fetty and Jacobs first crossed in November of
1993 through their mutual participation in the CanWeChat 2 discussion
group, a bulletin board system on the Internet. (R. at 2.) Both parties
continued to participate in this group throughout November and continuing into December. (R. at 2.) The discussions focused on the participants' views regarding abortion. (R. at 2.) Jennifer Fetty and Jacobs
expressed contrasting views on the abortion issue. (R. at 2.)
On December 4, 1993, Jennifer Fetty, Jacobs and the other members
of the discussion group were on-line discussing their views on abortion.
(R. at 2.) Jacobs attempted to discredit Ms. Fetty, with regard to her
views on abortion, by accusing her of prostituting herself. (R. at 2-3.)
Jacobs transmitted his defamatory message to Marshall where it was
received by another participant, David Bornmann. (See R. at 3.) David
Bornmann was outraged by Jacobs' "mean-spirited and slanderous personal accusations," and further suggested that if Jacobs could not be
civil, he should leave the discussion. (R. at 3.)
B.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Jennifer Fetty brought a defamation action against Jacobs in Marshall. (R. at 3.) The suit resulted from the defamatory statement that
was received and read by a resident of Marshall. (R. at 3.) Jacobs filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint claiming that the State of Marshall
lacked personal jurisdiction. (R. at 3.) His motion was based on his assertion that he was not a domiciliary of the State of Marshall and that he
1. The Internet, the world's largest computer network, has been described as a "vast
international network of networks that enables computers of all kinds to share services and
communicate directly, as if they were part of one giant, seamless, global computing
machine." Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soul of the Internet, TmE, July 25, 1994, at
50.
2. CanWeChat is operated by a system operator ("sysop") in Chicago, Illinois. (R. at

634

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIV

had neither visited nor conducted business in the state. (R. at 3.) Jacobs
also argued that the messages he posted in Illinois, which were subsequently received and read in Marshall, did not constitute minimum contacts as required by the Due Process clause of the United States
Constitution. (R. at 3.) Jacobs additionally asserted that Jennifer Fetty
was a limited-purpose public figure. (R. at 4.) Consequently, Jacobs attacked the sufficiency of the complaint for failure to allege that Jacobs
acted with actual malice. (R. at 4.)
The trial court held that Jacobs was subject to personal jurisdiction
in the State of Marshall under the Marshall long-arm statute. (R. at 5.)
As to Jacobs claim that Jennifer Fetty's complaint was insufficient, the
trial judge ruled that, as a matter of law, Jennifer Fetty was not a public
figure. (R. at 5.) The court did not address Jacobs' Due Process
challenge.
Jacobs filed a timely appeal of the judge's order to the Marshall
Court of Appeals. (R. at 5.) The court reviewed the matters of law de
novo and affirmed the orders of the circuit court. (R. at 5-6.) The court of
appeals held that Jacobs' participation in the bulletin board system established virtual legal presence in Marshall, thereby subjecting him to
personal jurisdiction in Marshall. (R. at 6.) The court also held that Jennifer Fetty was not a public figure, and therefore, did not bear the burden of proving actual malice. (R. at 5-6.) This Court granted leave to
appeal on June 22, 1995.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. Jurisdiction is the basis for a court's authority to require a defendant
to answer a lawsuit and to enforce a judgment against him. The Marshall long-arm statute allows courts to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who commit tortious acts within the state. In a libel
action, a tort occurs in every state in which the defamatory material is
circulated. Jacobs' transmission of defamatory material to a resident of
Marshall falls within this provision.
Jacobs' lack of physical contacts with Marshall is not a bar to jurisdiction. Jacobs' use of the CanWeChat bulletin board system established
virtual and legal presence in Marshall, thereby allowing the courts to
exercise specific jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction in this case is founded
on three traditional doctrines. First, Jacobs purposefully availed himself
of the privilege of communicating with residents of Marshall. Second,
Jacobs' communications injured Jennifer Fetty in Marshall. Marshall,
therefore, may also exercise jurisdiction under the effects test. Finally,
Jacobs' intentional placement of his defamatory remarks in an established distribution system, the Internet, provides the Marshall courts
with jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory. Jacobs could
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foresee that he would be subject to jurisdiction in Marshall on the basis
of these three theories, and thus, the Due Process Clause does not prevent jurisdiction in this case. This court therefore, should affirm the decisions of the lower courts and provide Jennifer Fetty relief for her
injuries.
II. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a conflict between
defamation law and First Amendment freedoms. Public officials and
public figures, therefore, must prove that a defamatory statement was
made with actual malice in order to recover. In this regard, the Court
has provided a three prong test to assist courts in deciding whether a
plaintiff is a public figure.
Jennifer Fetty's participation in a group discussion on the Internet
does not classify her as a limited-purpose public figure under this three
part test. First, this case does not involve a public controversy. While
the issue of abortion was the underlying topic of discussion for the
CanWeChat discussion group, the controversy was actually the personal
views of the participants in the group. The personal views of the participants is not an issue which could have substantial ramifications on the
general public. However, even if this Court decides that this case does
involve a public controversy, Jennifer Fetty did not "thrust" herself to
the forefront a public controversy with a reasonable expectation that she
could influence the resolution of the issue. Furthermore, Jennifer Fetty
did not have sufficient access to the media in order for her to adequately
rebut Jacobs' defamatory message. As a convenience store cashier, Ms.
Fetty is not in a position to attract members of the press to her rebuttal.
Additionally, she had no adequate means to respond to Jacobs' defamatory statements because the statements could conceivably have been disseminated to persons outside the CanWeChat discussion group. Because
Jennifer Fetty does not meet the three requirements of a limited-purpose
public figure, this Court should affirm the decisions of the lower courts
and provide Jennifer Fetty the opportunity to continue her suit against
Jacobs for her injuries without proving actual malice.
PROLOGUE
Personal jurisdiction and public figure status in the context of defamation actions are issues that have been addressed by courts on many
occasions. The facts of this case, however, are unique in that the dispute
between the parties arises out of their use of an Internet bulletin board
service. (R. at 2.) Accordingly, the issues in this case can only be effectively resolved if all parties involved have a basic understanding of the
Internet and computer bulletin board services.
The Internet originated as a United States Defense Department project approximately 25 years ago. Thomas D. Brooks, Note, CatchingJel-
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lyfish in the Internet: The Public-FigureDoctrine and Defamation on
Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 461, 469
(1995). It is the largest computer network in the world and currently
links together large commercial computer-communications services, universities, and government and corporate networks. Philip Elmer-Dewitt,
Battle for the Soul of the Internet, TIME, July 25, 1994, at 50. Although
the Internet originated in the United States, it presently allows communications on an international scale and is available to virtually anyone
with a computer. See id. This global communication system "reaches
nearly 25 million computer users ... and is doubling every year." Id.
Computer bulletin boards are two-way communication services that
can be accessed through the Internet. Robert Charles, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who Should Be Liable? Under What Standard?, 2 J. L. & TECH. 121, 124 (1987). Bulletin board subscribers can
"communicate inexpensively and instantaneously with a number of other
personal computer owners or users." Id. To date, approximately 100,000
bulletin boards exist worldwide, about 2,500 of which are available to
Internet users. Brooks, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. at 468.
Bulletin boards dedicated to a single discussion topic are now common
features on the Internet. Id. The CanWeChat discussion group, dedicated to societal views on abortion, is one example of a bulletin board
with a specific topic. (R. at 2.)
The Internet and bulletin board services such as CanWeChat are
unique because the participants are potential producers and consumers
of information. Mike Godwin, The FirstAmendment in Cyberspace, 4
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994). "Since the information can
flow in any direction, it is a many-to-many medium." Id. This case is a
prime example of how the Internet and computer bulletin boards are
playing an increasingly important role in the communications world and,
perhaps as importantly, the American legal system.
I. THE MARSHALL COURT MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY
EXERCISE JURISDICTION UNDER THE MARSHALL LONG-ARM
STATUTE TO REDRESS INJURIES THAT WERE THE
FORESEEABLE RESULT OF DEFAMATORY REMARKS
PURPOSEFULLY DIRECTED TOWARD THE CITIZENS OF
MARSHALL
This case raises an issue regarding the propriety of broadening the
permissible scope of in personam jurisdiction ("personal jurisdiction") to
properly accommodate advances in communications and the increased
mobilization of society. The need to expand jurisdiction was first recognized almost four decades ago by the United States Supreme Court. McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
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This need for expansion resulted from commercial activity that affected
multiple states. Id. The advent of the computer has made both commercial and multi-state communications commonplace.
"Unlike communication by mail or telephone, messages sent through
computers are available to the recipient and anyone else who may be
watching." California Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F.
Supp. 1356, 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1986). Computers allow individuals to interact simultaneously with individuals in several states. Modern technology's revolution of communications has made it imperative for courts to
"broaden correspondingly the permissible scope of jurisdiction exercisable by the courts." Id.
Despite the evolution of traditional jurisdiction principles, a valid
exercise of jurisdiction still requires compliance with both the state's
long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Thus,
the first issue before this court is whether the Marshall long-arm statute
confers personal jurisdiction over Jacobs.
Jacobs' initial objection to the jurisdiction of the Marshall court is
that he has never conducted business in Marshall. (R. at 3.) The Marshall long-arm statute, however, provides several different and independent types of conduct that subject a nonresident to jurisdiction in
Marshall. Jacobs' contention only applies to section I A (1) of the Marshall statute. Both lower courts, however, premised jurisdiction on section I A (2) of the statute-the commission of tortious acts within the
state. (R. at 1.)
A.

A TORT WITHIN THE STATE OF MARSHALL
WHEN HE TRANSMITTED His DEFAMATORY REMARKS To

JACOBS COMMITTED

MARSHALL.

Chapter 48, Section I, paragraph A, subparagraph 2 of the Marshall
Revised Statute provides in pertinent part: "Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries... as to courses of action which
arise from conduct enumerated in this section, who.., commit a tortious
act within the state of Marshall .... " (R. at 4.) The court's interpretation of this provision must necessarily begin with an assessment of
where the tortious activity is committed in a defamation action.
A general principle of tort law holds that defamation occurs wherever the offending material is circulated. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 577A cmt. a (1977). This principle stems from recognition that
publication or communication is a necessary component of defamation.
Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737, 742 (D. Nev. 1985). Defamation,
by definition, involves injuries sustained as the result of third parties
reading the false statements. Id. Consequently, courts that have consid-
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ered where the tort of defamation occurs have focused almost exclusively
on the location at which the defamed party suffers injury.
In the leading case on defamation, Keeton v.Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant was proper in any forum in which the
impact of the defamatory remarks was felt. Libelous actions cause two
types of injuries. First, false statements harm the defamed person. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777. "The reputation of the libel victim may suffer harm
even in a state in which he has hitherto been anonymous. The communication of the libel may create a negative reputation among the residents
of a jurisdiction where the plaintiffs previous reputation was, however
small, at least unblemished." Id. The recipients of the defamatory statements are also injured. Id. The state's interest in discouraging the deception of its citizens allows the state courts to exercise jurisdiction over
the author of the libelous statements. Employing both the interest of the
defamed party and the interest of the recipients of the defamatory
message, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant in a defamation action brought by another nonresident was
proper. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781.
Courts that have been called upon to interpret state long-arm statutes have overwhelmingly adopted the Keeton Court's holding and applied it to permit jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in defamation
actions. Several decisions have involved the interpretation of provisions
analogous to the Marshall long-arm statute. A fundamental principle of
statutory construction dictates that statutes containing similar language
and sharing a common purpose should be similarly interpreted. Northcross v. Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973). Marshall's longarm statute, therefore, should be construed accordingly.
The Illinois long-arm statute provides courts the power to exercise
jurisdiction over nonresidents who "[commit] a tortious act within the
state. . . ." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 5/2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1993). This
provision permits Illinois courts to exercise jurisdiction for a single tortious act committed in Illinois even if most of the defendant's activities
occur elsewhere. Rose v. Franchetti,713 F. Supp. 1203, 1209 (N.D. Ill.
1989), affd, 979 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1992). "The general rule is that where
tortious acts are committed over the telephone, the situs of the tort is the
place where the phone call is received." Id. Thus, as long as the fraudulent statement is received in Illinois, the tort occurred in Illinois for purposes of the Illinois long-arm statute. Id.
The Illinois long-arm statute was revisited by the Northern District
of Illinois in Wysnoski v.Millet, 759 F. Supp. 439, 442 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
The plaintiff in Wysnoski brought an action for a misrepresentation by
telecommunication that originated in Texas and was received in Illinois.
Id. at 441. The relevant inquiry for jurisdictional purposes is not where
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the information originates. Id. at 442. Rather, the focus is on where the
information is received. Id. The Wysnoski court concluded that the Illinois statute would permit the court to exercise jurisdiction if the defendant intended to communicate his message to Illinois. Id. "It is 'well
established Illinois law.., that use of the mails and telephone subjected
[the defendant] to jurisdiction.'" Id. quoting FMC Corp. v. Varonos, 892
F.2d 1308, 1313 (7th Cir. 1990).
Analogous provisions of the Florida and Nevada long-arm statutes,
providing jurisdiction over nonresident defendants for the commission of
tortious acts within the state, have been applied to allow jurisdiction in
defamation actions in which the articles originated outside the forum
state. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(b) (West. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 14.065 (1985). Under the Nevada statute, the defendants in a libel action were held to have committed a tort in Nevada since the defendants
had some responsibility for the publication of the defamatory remarks in
Nevada. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 742. 3 Similarly, a tort was committed
in Florida when defamatory remarks made during a telephone interview
between parties in New York and California were published in a magazine circulated in Florida. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir.
1990).
Jacobs' statements were circulated in Marshall. Jennifer Fetty suffered injury in Marshall when the circulated material was read by David
Bornmann, a Marshall resident. Under general tort principles, as well
as the application of similar long-arm provisions, Jacobs' transmission of
the libelous material to a Marshall resident constituted the commission
of a tortious act in Marshall. Jurisdiction, is therefore, proper under the
Marshall long-arm statute.
Additional support for this conclusion is provided by the liberal interpretations traditionally given to long-arm statues. "Most long-arm
statutes are drafted to permit the maximum possible exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process requirement . . . ." -Conrad M.
Shemadine, et al., Motions to Dismiss and Demurrers in Defamation Actions, 338 PLI/Pat 493, 493 (1992). This Court should apply a nonrestrictive application of the Marshall statute, thereby encompassing Jacobs'
actions and allowing Marshall courts to provide relief to victims of
libelous communications.

B.

SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER JACOBS IN MARSHALL DOES NOT
IMPLICATE DUE PROCESS CONCERNS.

Jacobs' second objection to the Marshall court's exercise of jurisdiction is that the complaint's failure to assert the presence of either party
3. The Nevada statue has been amended to provide for jurisdiction in a civil action on
any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution. NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (1991).
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in the State of Marshall rendered jurisdiction improper. (R. at 3.) Jacobs' argument is based on the mechanical and archaic physical presence
rule of Pennoyer v.Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Physical presence in the
forum state, however, is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Burger King
Corp. v.Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). Advances in communications and the increased mobilization of society long ago obviated the need
for physical presence within the forum state. Id. The new "constitutional touchstone" of jurisdiction involves "the relationship among the
defendant, the forum state, and the litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
1. Jacobs has minimum contacts with the State of Marshall
In order for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, due process requires that the defendant have minimum
contacts with the forum state such that jurisdiction would not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International
Shoe Co. v.Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Jurisdiction was upheld in InternationalShoe because the contacts of the corporation gave
rise to the cause of action.4 The Court concluded that when the activities
of a nonresident result in potential legal obligations in the forum, "so far
as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the [defendant] to respond
to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to
be undue." Id. at 391. The Court has refined this holding in later decisions to provide guidance for determining whether contacts of the defendant satisfy the standard.
i. Jurisdictionwas established by Jacobs' purposeful interactions with
a Marshallresident
The most significant qualification imposed by the Court is that the
defendant's contacts with the forum state must be purposeful. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, conditioned jurisdiction on "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
4. Specific jurisdiction, like that exercised by the Court in International Shoe, involves a situation in which the cause of action "arises out of or relates" to the defendant's
contacts with the forum. BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 472. Specific jurisdiction contrasts with
general jurisdiction in which the defendant's contacts have no necessary relationship to the
cause of action. Id. at 473 n.15. General jurisdiction relies on the defendant's "continuous
and systematic" activities with the forum state. Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign
Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1563 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, _ U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 18
(1994). Jennifer Fetty is not contending that Jacobs is subject to the general jurisdiction of
the court.
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Id. at 253. Jurisdiction is proper so long as the defendant's actions are
"purposefully directed toward the residents of the [forum] state." Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 476.
The publication of a defamatory letter in Rhode Island was held to
have constituted a purposefully initiated contact in Froess v. Bulman,
610 F. Supp. 332, 337 (D.R.I. 1984), affd, 767 F.2d 905 (1st Cir. 1985).
By sending defamatory material to the forum state, the defendant purposefully availed himself of the opportunity of conducting an activity in
the state. Id. Requiring the author of defamatory remarks to defend a
suit resulting from the defamatory statements in the forum in which the
injury is said to have occurred is fair. Id.
The purposeful availment requirement will not be met if the defendant's only contacts with the forum state were the result of the unilateral
activity of a third person. In Hanson, jurisdiction was denied because
the only contact the administrator of a will had with Florida was that the
decedent had moved to Florida after the will was drawn and the administrator mailed her a letter there. Hanson, 357 U.S. 235. Similarly, a defendant New York automobile dealer was not subject to jurisdiction in
Oklahoma when the only contact with the forum state was the plaintiffs
act of driving the car through the state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
The Court's message in Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen is
clear: jurisdiction is proper if a defendant, rather than a third party, purposefully directs its activities at the forum state. Thus, in Edwards v.
Associated Press, 512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1975), jurisdiction over a news
agency that defamed the plaintiff in Mississippi was proper even though
the agency broadcast the defamatory message by sending it electronically from Louisiana. The agency's purposeful transmission of the
message into Mississippi justified jurisdiction under the purposeful
availment analysis. Id. at 268.
Jacobs, like the agency in Edwards, had complete control over the
activities at issue in this case. Jacobs wrote and transmitted the false
statements about Jennifer Fetty. He participated in the discussion
group and had been interacting with the other group members throughout November and December. Jacobs wrote and dispersed his defamatory remarks with the intent that every person who accessed the bulletin
board system would read his message. Jacobs' actions constitute purposeful availment.
ii.

The tortious effects in Marshall resulting from Jacobs' conduct
establishedjurisdiction

A nonresident defendant may be held to have established minimum
contacts with the forum state based on activities conducted outside the
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state that have an effect in the state. The United States Supreme Court
first applied the effects test to a defamation action in Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783 (1984). Calder involved an action brought by a California
resident in response to an article written and edited in Florida by Florida
residents. Id. at 784-85. The California Court of Appeals upheld jurisdiction in California on the theory that the defendant intended to, and
did, cause injury in California. Id. at 787. In the words of the court of
appeals, "[t]he fact that the actions causing effects in California were
performed outside the State did not prevent the State from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects." Id. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, expressly approved of the court of appeals' use of the effects test. Id. at 787 n.6. The
effect of the libelous statements in California provided a sufficient basis
for jurisdiction in California. Id. at 789.
The focus under the effects test is the "act of intentionally direct[ing]
an alleged libel at a resident of the forum." Id. (quotation omitted). A
defendant's physical contacts with the forum state are irrelevant under
the effects test. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 743-44. Jurisdiction is proper
over a defendant who acts in an intentional manner so as to cause a tortious effect in the forum state. Id. at 744. Thus, a New York corporation,
by sending defamatory letters to its New Hampshire customers, was held
to have purposefully directed its activities at New Hampshire, thereby
establishing minimum contacts with New Hampshire on the basis of its
out-of-state conduct. Lex Computer & Management Corp. v. Eslinger &
Pelton, 676 F. Supp. 399, 404 (D.N.H. 1987).
The location of the highest volume of circulation is also irrelevant
under the effects test. Id. A single letter sent into the forum state is
sufficient to assert limited jurisdiction over the sender. Burt v. Board of
Regents of University of Nebraska, 757 F.2d 242, 244-45 (10th Cir.), cert.
granted 474 U.S. 1004 (1985), vacated as moot, 475 U.S. 1063 (1986).
"[Ihf a libel party occurs on a bulletin board covering many states, the
plaintiff can sue in any state in which she can prove that someone received the defamatory message." John C. Faucher, Let the Chips Fall
Where They May: Choice ofLaw in Computer Bulletin Board Defamation
Cases, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1045, 1049 (1993).

In the present action, Jacobs prepared a defamatory article and
transmitted it to the other members of the discussion group, including at
least one Marshall resident. (R. at 3.) A tortious effect occurred in Marshall when Mr. Bornmann received and read Jacobs' defamatory remarks. A defendant's act of preparing a libelous statement and directing
the statement into the forum state satisfies the effects test. Laxalt, 622
F. Supp. at 744. Jacobs' actions, therefore, subject him to jurisdiction
under the effects test. Furthermore, Jacobs' selection of an established
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distribution channel as his transmission medium subjects him to jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory.
iii. Jurisdictionis proper as a consequence of Jacobs' decision to
transmit his comments on a nationwide communication system
The stream of commerce theory evolved out of the foreseeability inquiry associated with due process. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the
Supreme Court recognized that the foreseeability that is critical to the
due process analysis is that the defendant's conduct is such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. The foreseeability inquiry ensures that potential defendants can structure their conduct with some
assurance as to where they may be subjected to liability. Id. The requisite level of foreseeability is present, and consequently due process is not
violated, if the defendant "delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in
the forum state." Id. at 298.
The stream of commerce theory has been the source of confusion
since the Court's decision in Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior
Court, 490 U.S. 102 (1987). Four Justices of the Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice O'Connor, concluded that minimum contacts required more than the mere placement of a product into the stream of
commerce. Id. at 112. Such an act, even if done with an awareness that
the stream will sweep the product into the forum, is insufficient. Id.
Conversely, Justice Brennan, writing on behalf of four members of the
Court, concluded that "jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). A showing of additional
5
conduct is not required. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court has not addressed the stream of commerce theory since its decision in Asahi. The Federal Circuit, however, appears to
favor Justice Brennan's position for application in high technology cases.
In Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. dismissed, _ U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 18 (1994), the plaintiff brought
a patent infringement action in Virginia alleging that the defendants
purposefully shipped infringing products into Virginia through the use of
an established distribution channel. Id. at 1565. The cause of action for
patent infringement arose from these actions. Id. "No more is usually
required to establish specific jurisdiction." Id.
The Beverly Hills court distinguished World-Wide Volkswagen, in
which the contacts with the forum state resulted from the unilateral acts
of a third party. Id. The contacts in Beverly Hills were the result of the
5. Justice Stevens did not join in either opinion.
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defendant's own actions. Id. Jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
is proper if the defendant purposefully places the article in an established distribution channel. Id.
Although the stream of commerce theory was originally applied to
the distribution of physical objects, the theory applies with equal force to
the transmission of data through the Internet. "[Jurisdiction under the
stream of commerce theory] rests on the reasonable inference that the
sale of a large number of devices to a firm with a nationwide distribution
network will generally result in the sale-or at least the use-of one of
those devices in the [forum state]." Ensign-Bickford Co. v. ICI Explosives
USA Inc., 817 F. Supp. 1018, 1028 (D. Conn. 1993). The Internet is also
a nationwide distribution network. Users of the Internet can foresee
that their messages may reach at least one resident of each state.
Jurisdiction over a defendant is proper if the defendant knew, or
should have known, that the chosen distribution channel was broad
enough to include any state. Violet v. Picillo, 613 F. Supp. 1563, 1578
n.15 (D.R.I. 1985). The Internet is an extensive communication system
that connects the entire country. Jurisdiction is proper because Jacobs
should have known that the Internet was broad enough to reach residents of Marshall.
The First Circuit recognized the applicability of the stream of commerce theory to defamation actions in Hugel v. McNell, 886 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1079 (1990). The First Circuit recognized that the focus behind the stream of commerce theory is whether
the nonresident defendant's acts establish a substantial connection with
the forum state. Id. Defamation is an intentional tort. Id. A defendant's intent for an article to be published and disseminated nationwide,
thereby causing damage to a plaintiffs reputation in the forum state,
subjects the defendant to jurisdiction in the forum state. Id. at 5. Similarly, Jacobs' intent to injure Jennifer Fetty's reputation among the
members of the discussion group, including a Marshall resident, provides
the Marshall courts with jurisdiction to redress the injuries resulting
from the defamatory remarks. A reasonable user of an extensive distribution network that reaches the forum state "has to expect to be hailed
into the courts of that state, however distant, to answer for any liability
based at least in part on that [distribution]." North Am. Philips Corp. v.
Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
2.

Jurisdictionover Jacobs in Marshall does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantialjustice

Although a finding of minimum contacts establishes a presumption
of reasonableness, the court still must decide whether the "fair play and
substantial justice" factors would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Les-
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lie W. Abramson, Clarifying "FairPlay and Substantial Justice": How
the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standardfor PersonalJurisdiction,
18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 444-45 (1991). In Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court, Justice O'Connor, in a part of the opinion joined by
seven other members of the Court, stated that "the determination of the
reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on
an evaluation of several factors." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113. These factors
are "the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and
the interest of the plaintiff in obtaining relief." Id. 6 Based on these factors, the Court denied jurisdiction over Asahi, a Japanese corporation, in
California, not because the company lacked minimum contacts with the
state, but because the totality of the circumstances would not comport
with fairness and justice. Id.
This analysis again reveals that jurisdiction over Jacobs in Marshall
is proper. The interest of the forum state in this litigation is extremely
high. The record reveals that Jacobs deliberately sent defamatory remarks about Jennifer Fetty to David Bornmann. (R. at 2-3.) Jennifer
Fetty suffered an injury in Marshall as a result of this exchange. "[I]t is
beyond dispute that [Marshall] has a significant interest in redressing
injuries that actually occur within the State." Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776.
The state's interest extends to libel actions brought by nonresidents. Id.
Marshall also has a strong interest in protecting its residents from
the deception resulting from false accusations. Id. Marshall's interest is
best served by allowing the state to enforce its libel laws against both
residents and nonresidents.
Jennifer Fetty also has an interest in seeking redress for her injuries. A plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief is generally served by allowing the suit to remain in the forum of choice if the record indicates
that the suit could not be maintained over the defendant in any other
forum. PittsburghTerminal Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp., 831 F.2d 522,
529 (4th Cir. 1987). The statue of limitations in Illinois, the residence of
both parties, has run. Consequently, a decision by this court finding jurisdiction unreasonable would deny relief.
Similar considerations were probably influential in the Court's determination that jurisdiction was not unreasonable in New Hampshire
over an Ohio publishing corporation with its principal place of business
in California in Keeton, 465 U.S. 770. The Keeton Court recognized that
most injuries in a libel action will occur outside the forum state unless
6. This language was similar to that which had previously appeared in World-Wide
Volkswagen that listed the factors to be weighed as "the burden on the defendant,... the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, [and] the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief. ....
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citations
omitted).
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the action is brought in the plaintiffs domicile. Id. at 780. Nonetheless,
this result does not justify restricting libel actions to the plaintiffs home
forum. "The victim of a libel, like the victim of any other tort, may
choose to bring suit in any forum with which the defendant has certain
minimum contacts." Id. quoting InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
Releasing a defendant from jurisdiction in any forum other than the
place of origination would have the net effect of treating defamation actions as if they never occurred. Most users of the Internet are individuals without extensive resources. The Internet's ability to connect users
in multiple states makes it highly probable that a user on the East Coast
will injure a party on the West coast. So long as the potential defendant
knew he would not be traveling to the forum state within the limitation
period, he would be free from liability. Limiting jurisdiction would allow
users to defame with immunity. "A defendant effectively becomes judgment proof when individuals with small claims cannot afford the cost of
bringing an action in an inconvenient forum." Abramson, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. at 457. "Defamed persons have rights too." Buckley v. New
York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 180 (2nd Cir. 1967). Courts should not
treat the circulation of a libelous publication outside the state of initial
publication as if it never occurred. Id.
Finally, litigating in Marshall places no unjust burden on Jacobs.
Once minimum contacts are established, "the interest of the plaintiff and
the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the.., defendant." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114. A finding that
a defendant has satisfied the purposeful availment requirement may be
an implicit statement that the defendant's election to engage in the conduct which led to the filing of the lawsuit reduces any burden incurred by
the defendant. Morris v.SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 495 (11th Cir. 1988).
Similarly, a nonresident defendant's deliberate conduct that has a foreseeable effect on the plaintiff in the forum may affect the court's assessment of the burden of litigating in the forum. Abramson, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. at 451.

It is highly possible that it is more convenient for Jacobs to litigate
in a forum other than Marshall. Nonetheless, Jacobs' failure to structure
his conduct to avoid litigation in Marshall subjects him to jurisdiction in
Marshall. See Violet, 613 F. Supp. at 1578.
"Looking back over the long history of litigation a trend is clearly
discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction
over foreign corporations and other nonresidents." McGee, 355 U.S. at
222. "There has been a movement away from the bias favoring the defendant in matters of personal jurisdiction toward permitting the plaintiff to insist that the defendant come to him when there is a sufficient
basis for doing so." Buckley, 373 F.2d at 181. Jurisdiction in this case is
in keeping with this trend. It is within the bounds of due process be-
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cause Jacobs' contacts with Mr. Bornmann, a resident of Marshall, gave
rise to the cause of action and jurisdiction is both fair and reasonable.
II. THE MARSHALL COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD
THAT JENNIFER FETTY IS NOT A PUBLIC FIGURE BECAUSE
SHE DID NOT VOLUNTARILY THRUST OR INJECT HERSELF
INTO A PUBLIC CONTROVERSY, IN AN ATTEMPT TO
INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME, SHE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT
ACCESS TO THE MEDIA, AND BECAUSE PUBLIC POLICY
FAVORS SUCH A DECISION
This case additionally raises an issue of constitutional dimensions
regarding whether Jennifer Fetty is a limited-purpose public figure
merely because she participated in a discussion group on the Internet. If
she is a limited-purpose public figure, she must prove that Jacobs acted
with actual malice, and it will be more difficult for her to recover. However, if she is not a limited-purpose public figure, Jennifer Fetty can
maintain her action against Jacobs and recover for her injuries. Jacobs
maintains that Jennifer Fetty is a limited-purpose public figure merely
by virtue of her participation in the CanWeChat discussion group on the
Internet. (R. at 4.) The determination of whether Jennifer Fetty is a
public or private figure is ultimately one of law. Reuber v. Food Chem.
News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212
(1991). Therefore, review is de novo. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
557 (1988). Additionally, when determining if a plaintiff is a public figure, courts must "look through the eyes of a reasonable person at the
facts taken as a whole." Waldbaum v. FairchildPublications,Inc., 627
F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied 449 U.S. 898 (1980). This determination of public or private figures status is necessary because of the
differing standards of culpability for recovering compensatory damages.
Id. In a defamation action, public figures must prove "actual malice" to
recover compensatory damages. Id. Private individuals, on the other
hand, are not confronted with this heightened burden. Id. Therefore,
upholding the decision that Jennifer Fetty is a private individual, and
not a limited-purpose public figure, permits her to recover and justice to
be served.
A.

JENNIFER FETTY

Is NOT A PUBLIC

FIGURE ACCORDING

By THE SUPREME COURT
ROBERT WELCH, INC.

CRITERIA SET OUT

IN

To

THE

GERTZ V.

The First Amendment has long protected the rights of individuals to
freely speak their minds. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Defamation law, on
the other hand, provides compensation for those who have suffered damage to their reputation by someone who is abusing his right to free
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speech. Laura L. Saadeh, Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc.: The Supreme CourtFurtherMuddies the Defamation Waters, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 209, 209 (1986). "When the threat of having to
pay that compensation hinders free speech, the two areas of law collide."
Id.
American defamation law evolved from the English common law of
defamation. Jamie D. Batterman, Comment, The FirstAmendment Protection of the Freedoms of Speech and the Press and its Effect on the Law
of Defamation as Seen Through the Eyes of Brennan: His Impact and Its
Future, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 233, 236 (1992). Prior to 1964, defamation
law was grounded exclusively in state common law and was a strict liability offense that could only be defended on the basis that a defamatory
statement was true or that the defendant was entitled to a privilege.
Thomas D. Brooks, Note, Catching Jellyfish in the Internet: Public Figure Doctrine and Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS
COMPUTER

&

TECH.

L.J. 461, 470-72 (1995).

In 1964, the United States Supreme Court drastically altered defamation law when it recognized the conflict between defamation law and
First Amendment rights in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). The Court in New York Times held that a plaintiff in a defamation action who was a "public official" must prove that a defamatory
statement against her was made with actual malice before she could recover. Id. at 279-80.7
Three years after deciding New York Times, the Supreme Court
made it more difficult to sue for defamation by extending the actual malice requirement to "public figures" in addition to "public officials." Curtis
PublishingCo. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). The Court appeared to
be expanding the actual malice requirement again in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), when a plurality held that even private persons would have to meet the actual malice requirement if the
discussion or defamatory statement concerns a matter of public interest.
Id. at 43-44.
In 1974, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected the Rosenbloom
holding in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court in
Gertz focused on the status of defamation plaintiffs in holding that private individuals are more vulnerable to injury than public figures, and
thus, the state has a greater interest in protecting them. Id. at 343-44.
The Court made it clear that in defamation actions, it is imperative to
determine whether the plaintiff is a public figure or a private individual.
Id. at 343-46. In adopting this test, the Gertz Court established two
7. The Court defined "actual malice" to be "knowledge that [the statement] was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
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types of public figures-general public figures and limited-purpose public figures. See id. at 345.
General public figures are those individuals who are public figures
for all purposes. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294. They are those individuals who have achieved celebrity status or whose name is a household
word. Id. at 1292. General public figures include persons such as Ralph
Nader, Jimmy Carter, and Jerry Falwell. Erik Walker, Comment, Defamation Law: Public Figures-Who Are They?, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 955,
960 (1993). It is important to note, however, that an individual should
only be deemed to be a general public figure after a clear showing of "general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in
the affairs of society. . . " Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294 quoting Gertz,
418 U.S. at 352. In this case, there has been no showing that Jennifer
Fetty, a convenience store cashier, (R. at 2.) meets these criteria. Accordingly, she is not a public figure for all purposes, and the issue becomes
whether she is a limited-purpose public figure.
A limited-purpose public figure is an individual who has "thrust
[herself] to the forefront of [a] particular public controvers[y] in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
The Gertz Court set forth a three-prong test for determining whether a
plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure. Id. at 345, 351. First, there
must be a public controversy. Id. at 351. Second, the plaintiff must have
thrust herself to the forefront of the public controversy to influence its
ultimate resolution. Id. at 345. Finally, the plaintiff must have greater
access to channels of communication than private individuals usually enjoy. Id. at 344. Applying the Gertz test to Jennifer Fetty's case makes it
clear that she is not a limited-purpose public figure.
1.

Jennifer Fetty was not involved in a public controversy

The first factor in the test for determining if a person is a limitedpurpose public figure is whether she was involved in a public controversy. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. This factor requires a court to distinguish
between a matter of public interest and something that is truly a public
controversy. Time, Inc. v. Firestone,424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). While the
Supreme Court has never specifically defined "public controversy," several cases shed some light on this issue. The United States Supreme
Court has stated that newsworthiness alone is not enough. Waldbaum,
627 F.2d at 1296. Instead, a public controversy is a dispute that receives
public attention because of the ramifications it will have on even those
who do not directly participate in it. Id.
Admittedly, abortion is a public controversy. However, the controversy in this case is Jennifer Fetty's views on abortion, and not the issue
of abortion itself. The court in Waldbaum astutely noted that the true

650

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XIV

controversy in a discussion or debate may not always be the underlying
topic of public interest. See id. at 1296 n.23. Debates are often sparked
over the strategies of lawyers involved in specific trials. Id. However,
the controversy is not the matter being litigated but rather the specific
strategies of the attorneys. See id. The example given by the court in
Waldbaum is analogous to the facts in this case.
Jennifer Fetty was involved in a discussion that revolved around the
participants' views on abortion. (R. at 2.) Each of the participants expressed his or her personal views on the subject. (R. at 2.) While the
issue of abortion was the topic of the group's discussion, (R. at 2), the
controversy surrounded the differing views of each participant. This is
made clear by Jacobs' defamatory statement that, "[als for Jennifer
Fetty's opinions on this matter, I'm not going to let some woman who
prostitutes herself dictate my standards of conduct or morality." (R. at 23.) Because the controversy revolved around the views of the participants, it was not a "public controversy" which "affect[ed] the general public or some segment of it in an appreciable way." Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at
1296. Therefore, the public controversy requirement of the Gertz test is
not satisfied in this case. If, however, this Court determines that the
controversy in this case is abortion, and thus a public controversy, Jennifer Fetty still prevails because she had no control over the outcome of
the controversy and she did not have sufficient access to the media to
adequately rebut Jacobs' defamatory statement.
2.

Jennifer Fetty did not voluntarily inject herself into a controversy
in an effort to influence its resolution

The second factor used to determine whether Jennifer Fetty is a limited-purpose public figure is whether she "thrust [herself] to the forefront
of [a] particular public controvers[y] in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Plaintiffs who are limited-purpose public figures through participation in controversies invite
attention and comment. Id. A good example of a limited-purpose public
figure can be found in Waldbaum. The plaintiff in Waldbaum, was the
president and CEO of the second-largest food cooperative in the nation
and played an active role in setting policies and standards within the
supermarket industry. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1290. He was an activist
in the supermarket industry and a "mover and shaper of many of the
cooperative's controversial actions." Id. at 1300. The court found that
Waldbaum was a limited-purpose public figure because he thrust himself
into the debate over issues relating to the cooperative in an attempt to
influence the policies of the supermarket industry. Id.
In Underwagerv. Salter, 22 F.3d 730 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, _ U.S.
__,
115 S.Ct. 351 (1994), the limited-purpose public figure status was
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also imposed on the authors of a book on sexual abuse of children. Id. at
731. The defendant reviewed the book and stated that it misrepresented
studies and ignored evidence contradicting the book's thesis. Id. at 732.
The Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures despite the fact that ordinary persons could not identify the
plaintiffs. Id. at 734. The court stated that the plaintiffs were well
known in the medical, legal, and scientific fields regarding child sexual
abuse. Id. This recognition was sufficient to cause them to be limitedpurpose public figures. Id.
Jennifer Fetty is hardly in a position analogous to the plaintiffs in
Waldbaum and Underwager. She was not publicly active in rallies or
debates on the issue of abortion other than her discussions on the
CanWeChat bulletin board system. Contrary to the plaintiff in
Waldbaum, it would be difficult to consider Jennifer Fetty to be a "mover
and shaper" of anything relating to the broad issue of abortion. Furthermore, she is not well known among the individuals who have the power
to affect the outcome of the abortion issue.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), the issue of abortion has been a hotly debated issue. The topic
has been openly and widely discussed in a wide range of forums throughout the nation. While the issue is one that commands a great deal of
public interest, controversy, and attention, there are relatively few individuals who possess the power to influence policies regarding abortion
rights. Those persons who possess this ability include President Clinton,
First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, members of the United States Congress, and Supreme Court Justices. While Jennifer Fetty may have been
in a position to influence the opinions of those participating on
CanWeChat, this limited opportunity to persuade does not allow her to
be classified with these individuals when one considers her inability to
impact the issue of abortion.
To be a limited-purpose public figure, Jennifer Fetty must "have
been purposely trying to influence the outcome" or have "realistically...
expected, because of [her] position in the controversy, to have an impact
on its resolution." Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297 (citingNote, An Analysis
of the DistinctionBetween Public Figures and PrivateDefamationPlaintiffs Applied to Relatives of PublicPersons, 49 S.CAL. L. REV. 1131, 121011 (1976)). Jennifer Fetty simply does not fit this description. She is a
cashier at a local convenience store in Peoria, Illinois, (R. at 2), who does
not occupy a prominent position with regard to the abortion issue. She
had no reasonable expectation of affecting the resolution of this issue.
Additionally, there is no indication that she took part in any activities or
debates relating to the issue of abortion other than her participation in
the CanWeChat discussions on the bulletin board system. While she voluntarily entered the on-line discussion and may have been in a position
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to influence the opinions of the members of the group, she lacked the
ability to influence public or national policy on the issue of abortion.
Therefore, she did not voluntarily thrust herself into the forefront of
a public controversy.
3. Jennifer Fetty does not have sufficient access to the media
The third factor in determining Jennifer Fetty's improbable status
as a limited-purpose public figure is whether she had sufficient access to
the media. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. Because "public figures usually
enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements[,]" private individuals are more vulnerable to defamation
and the state has a greater interest in protecting them. Id.
One idea behind making it easier for private individuals to sue for
defamation is that public individuals can hold press conferences and rebut negative comments. Mike Godwin, The FirstAmendment in Cyberspace, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994). On the other hand, if

a private individual were to hold a press conference, reporters simply
would not attend. Id. When Gertz was decided in 1974, the media admittedly encompassed more than just the written press. It also included
radio and television news and information sources. As times have
changed and technology has advanced, however, the term "media" has
become more amorphous and undoubtedly more difficult to define. With
the advent of computers, and ultimately Internet bulletin board services
such as CanWeChat, it has become necessary to determine whether the
Internet can be considered a viable media source by which defamation
victims such as Jennifer Fetty can adequately rebut their accusers.
Much like the term "public controversy," the United States Supreme
Court has never defined "media" for purposes of the Gertz test. Brooks,
21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. at 478. In fact, one scholar has likened the "media" concept to that of pornography: "[T]he justices know it
when they see it." Id. Accordingly, this Court is faced with the daunting
task of determining whether Jennifer Fetty has sufficient access to the
media based solely on her status as an Internet user.
The determination of whether Jennifer Fetty had sufficient access to
the media requires this Court to focus on her situation before Jacobs
placed his defamatory statement on the CanWeChat bulletin board. See
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135-36 (1979). In Hutchinson, the
plaintiff had access to the media, but only after the defamatory statements were made. Id. This type of media access is inadequate because
"those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create
their own defense by making the claimant a public figure." Id.
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To date, no published opinion has addressed the issue of whether the
Internet is considered an adequate media source for purposes of rebutting defamatory statements. One court, however, has discussed whether
the Internet is a media source in general. This discussion reviewed the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct regarding attorney advertising. Texans Against Censorship,Inc. v. State Bar of Texas, 888 F.
Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Lonnie Morrison, the president-elect
of the State Bar of Texas at the time, testified that the drafters of the
rule allowing lawyers to advertise in the public media "never considered
the potentiality that the. .. rules might be applied to [Internet] communications." Id. at 1369-70. Regardless, the court determined that advertising on the Internet was the equivalent of advertising in the public
media. Id. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the Internet would not be
considered a form of media. In defamation cases, however, the media
source must provide the target of a defamatory statement with adequate
opportunity to rebut the statement. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. The
question then becomes one of whether the Internet, as a public media
source, allows Jennifer Fetty the opportunity to adequately rebut the
message posted by Jacobs on the CanWeChat bulletin board service.
There are commentators who believe that Internet users can rebut
defamatory statements posted on the Internet because they have access
to the same medium upon which they were defamed. See Godwin, 4
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, at 7-8; Brooks, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. at 480-83. The Fourth Circuit, for example, held that the
plaintiff had sufficient access to the media for purposes of responding to
a reprimand letter leaked to the media because he had access to the precise "fora where [his] reputation was presumably tarnished and where it
could be redeemed." Reuber, 925 F.2d at 708; see also Colson v. Stieg, 433
N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ill. 1982).
Although Jennifer Fetty has access to the Internet and the
CanWeChat bulletin board service, she may not have access to the precise fora where she was defamed because she has no idea who received
the defamatory statement posted by Jacobs. For instance, the Internet
provides users with the capability to download and print any message
posted on a bulletin board service. Terri A. Cutrera, ComputerNetworks,
Libel and the FirstAmendment, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 555, 562 (1992). Accordingly, a defamatory statement that is printed off the bulletin board
system could be widely disseminated by a sender or user who receives
the message. Jacobs, or anyone logged on to CanWeChat on December 4,
1993, could conceivably print and circulate to the public at large Jacobs'
message regarding Jennifer Fetty's views on abortion. Assuming that to
be the case, it becomes apparent that Jennifer Fetty could not possibly
respond to Jacobs' statement because the Internet does not guarantee
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her a pervasive media source capable of adequately rebutting Jacobs' defamatory statement.
B.

PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS A FINDING THAT JENNIFER FEry Is NOT A
LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE BASED SOLELY ON HER

PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNET DISCUSSION

GROUP, CANWECHAT
If, as Jacobs asserts, Jennifer Fetty is a limited-purpose public figure based solely on her participation in the CanWeChat discussion group
on the Internet, then everyone who accesses and uses the Internet is a
public figure. See David Gordon, Taking the First Amendment on the
Road: A Rationalefor Broad Protectionfor Freedom of Expression on the
Information Superhighway, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 135, 142 (1995).
Common sense, however, dictates that a computer user who is defamed
on a discussion group bulletin board is a private person. See Terri A.
Cutrera, Computer Networks, Libel and the First Amendment, 11 COMPUTER/L. J. 555, 570 (1992).
The danger in extending the public figure doctrine to Internet users
is that it opens the door for unlimited and illogical application of the
doctrine. For example, an analogy can easily be drawn between the use
of a discussion group bulletin board service and a conference telephone
call. If the facts and parties in this case were identical except that the
conversations took place on a conference call, the court would have difficulty justifying a distinction between Jennifer Fetty's status as a public
figure on the Internet and her status as a private figure when using the
telephone. The consequences of extending public figure status to Internet users could have far-reaching and undesirable effects. Conceivably, a student discussing abortion with several friends at school could be
classified as a public figure. Although this determination seems illogical,
the rational progression of a decision by this Court, that Jennifer Fetty is
a public figure based on her use of the Internet, could lead to such a
result.
Characterization of Jennifer Fetty as a limited-purpose public figure, based solely on her use of the Internet, would effectively render the
distinction between public and private figures in defamation actions
meaningless. Erasing the line between public and private figures would
destroy the balance between free speech and the protection of one's reputation. This imbalance would undermine the New York Times decision,
wherein the Court determined that First Amendment principles impact
defamation law. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 379-80. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has not found a defamation plaintiff to be a limited-purpose public figure under any circumstances. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at
326, 351-52 (holding that a lawyer accused of being a communist conspir-
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ator for suing a police officer for wrongful-death was not a public figure);
Wolston v. Reader's DigestAss'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 161-67 (1979)(holding that the plaintiff, who had been held in contempt for 16 years for
refusing to appear before a grand jury regarding Soviet espionage investigations, was not a public figure); Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 134-37 (holding that a professor, who had been berated in the public media by a
United States senator, was not a public figure); Time, 424 U.S. at 454-55
(holding that a wealthy party in a divorce, who held press conferences
regarding the case, was not a public figure).
Public figures are those individuals who "hold themselves up to public scrutiny, while private people do not." Cutrera, 11 COMPUTER/L. J. at
570. Jennifer Fetty, by participating in the CanWeChat discussion
group on the Internet, did not hold herself out to be ridiculed by Jacobs
or the public at large. Furthermore, she did not thrust herself to the forefront of a public controversy merely by espousing her views on abortion.
The classification of Jennifer Fetty as a limited-purpose public figure
based solely on her participation and use of the Internet runs contrary to
public policy.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the decisions of the trial court and the Marshall Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for the Respondent
John Matney
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APPENDIX
MARSHALL REVISED STATUTES

Marshall Long-Arm Statute
Chapter 48
I.

Personal Jurisdiction by Acts of a Non-Domiciliary.

A. Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries,
their administrators or executors, as to courses of action which arise
from conduct enumerated in this section, who in person or through an
agent:
1) conduct or transact business within the state of Marshall;
2) commit a tortious act within the state of Marshall; or
3) commit a tortious act outside the state of Marshall which causes injury to persons or property within the state of Marshall, if he or she
(a) regularly conducts or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from services rendered or goods consumed or used in the
state of Marshall, or
(b) expects or should reasonably expect his or her conduct to
have consequences in the state of Marshall and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

